Surrendering to Symbols
United States Policy Towards Indonesia 1961-1965
Stig Aga Aandstad
Cand. Philol. Dissertation in History
University of Oslo
Spring 1999
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Contents
IntroductionThe project's aim is to write a history of official US policy toward Indonesia during the years 1961 to 1965, under the administrations of Kennedy and Johnson. This work will establish how the Kennedy administration from the inherited problems of the Eisenhower-administration’s polices formed a unified and broad policy to secure Indonesia’s continued neutralism or turn it westwards, and how the US acted according to this policy until September 1965. Read chapter...
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Chapter 1The first chapter introduces Kennedy’s presidency. The different actors are first introduced alongside the administrations initial perceptions of Indonesia and policy towards the country. Then the agendas that first appeared on Kennedy’s desk follow, notably the lingering dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West Irian. After that follows a discussion of the military situation and how the US chose to respond to the massive Soviet influx of arms, followed by an overview over economic interests and assistance. Read chapter...
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Chapter 2The second chapter introduces the new forward action initiated by Kennedy. The new push forward is introduced by the solution of the West Irian issue. The next subchapter treats the massive Action Plan for Indonesia, which Kennedy introduced to exploit the positive environment that emerged after the West Irian solution. I then look closer into how the action plan was implemented and particularly the problems with oil that almost ruined the implementation. Read chapter...
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Chapter 3The third chapter deals with the transition from Kennedy to Johnson. I start with a treatment of the range of problems building up for the implementation of Kennedy’s Action Plan: First the build-up of a new and alternative ideological worldview in Djakarta, and then the sudden confrontation with Malaysia that halted the offensive thrust of Kennedy’s action scheme. The chapter finishes off with how Johnson continued Kennedy’s plan, but was unable to revive the offensive part of US policy. Read chapter...
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Chapter 4In the fourth chapter, the initiative lies in Djakarta. I introduce the chapter with a description of the campaign against US installations in Indonesia. Then I describe two major re-evaluations of US policy forced by events in Indonesia, which both adjusted the emphasis of US policy without altering the US commitment to the defensive part of the US policy. I continue with a treatment of how and why the US started to demonstrate military strength to Indonesia. The final subchapter tells how US continually sought to forward aid to the Indonesian military, but was hindered by concern to the British, the Congress and the Indonesian army’s reluctance to receive US support—and accordingly how the defensive part of the US policy stemming from 1962 was undermined and given up. I end my treatment when the isolated, few US officials left in Djakarta called in the message that woke the administration on October, 1, 1965: That Indonesia may be lost to the communists in a coup, and all trusted friends were dead or missing. Read chapter...
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ConclusionIn addition to the concluding arguments, a short epilogue will sum up the events following september 1965, for the benefit of the reader. Read chapter...
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Produced: 2/5/1999
© Stig Aga Aandstad
Historisk Institutt, Universitet i Oslo