IV. Fall 1964–September 1965: Surrendering to Symbols

US policy towards Indonesia during Johnson has traditionally been described as one where the US assumes a harder line towards Indonesia while reducing its presence. H.W. Brands divides US policy towards Indonesia under Johnson into three phases: First one of hesitance and non-policy, then one of reassumed initiative.² The reassumed initiatives fails during fall 1964 and winter 1965, and by April 1965 it is replaced by a US withdrawal. Frederick Bunnell describes the seeming shift in US policy from April 1965 and onwards as the initiation of a new low posture policy. ³ In Bunnell’s interpretation, the US continued their presence, but assumed a retracted position which was less vulnerable to violent anti-American actions. Paul Gardner treats the same policy shift as a change away from Jones’ accommodationist line and to an unspecified hard line. ⁴

Common for these interpretations is that they reflect the US policy as seen from the press and public, and in a short-term context. For instance, during winter 1963 the public image was one of lack of initiative in US policy, while the RFK mission and the secret Quadripartite talks both could be seen as initiatives, and the administration at this time worked to safeguard their running aid programs. Likewise, the public debate on aid to Indonesia in summer 1964 could be interpreted as signs of initiative, although for the administration, we have seen that they represented either continuance or actual downscaling of US involvement in Indonesia. Hence, Brands’ two first phases are somewhat arbitrary when relating to the administrations’ policy, but makes more sense when relating to the public image of the administration’s policy. After April 1965, the US, as Brands observes, withdrew most of their visible presence from Indonesia, until only a skeleton staff remained by September 1965. Brand’s final phase corresponds with the period Bunnell refers as the one of low posture policy, and which Gardner refers to as the end of the Jones’ accommodationist line, epitomized in the replacement of Jones by Marshall Green as US ambassador in Djakarta.

However, from a policy making perspective, it is more relevant to describe US policy under Johnson as continuos, but interrupted by a few bursts of Indonesian actions leading to US reconsideration. These short interludes of reconsideration led to adjustments of US assessments and policy, and a shift of emphasis, but they did not alter the basic course of events, nor US policy or strategy. Seen in light of the US dual policy stemming from 1962, the US continued its defensive strategy until September 1965. The modifications made to policy was primarily made to safeguard the basic US policy, and was done in response to external pressure.

The external pressures that forced the US to shift emphasis primarily originated with PKI, from Congress, from the US press and from London The anti-American campaigns were a crucial element in the rising pressure. They were led by the PKI, but had increasing support from the Indonesian government and to some extent also by the military. By 1965, Konfrontasi was in Washington seen as closely connected or a part of this campaign.

Another was the role of the US actors and bureaucracy: The vital role assigned to the ambassador withered, since the personal relationship were primarily a facet of the now defunct US offensive strategy. The relationship also had lost its foundation in the Kennedy-Sukarno rapport, and Jones became increasingly exhausted and in conflict with his embassy. In the Washington bureaucracy, handling of Indonesian matters were hindered by the overall effort and concern attached to Vietnam, making initiatives possible only when events demanded direct top-level attention, which in turn only arose after major advances for the anti-American campaigns in Indonesia.

The US press and the Congress continuously monitored US actions in Indonesia, and pressed for a harder line against Indonesia. With few variations, the pressure from the Indonesian left-wing, London and Congress coincided. Although, the White House sought to avoid confrontation and continued to seek contact with anticommunist Indonesian elements through aid, the external pressure forced them to gradually disassemble the aid and abandon contacts. Eventually, it was the Indonesians that refused US help, on the grounds that US help hurt more than it helped. Hence, the US had gradually lost contact with the Indonesian military, until the formal contact programs with the army had been all but severed by September 1965, and the US only maintained an isolated and symbolic skeleton staff in Indonesia whose main tasks were to keep up the informal contacts that still existed and maintain US presence until the situation improved.

Psychological Warfare and the Diplomacy of Pique

By summer 1964, the US still considered alternative methods of solving Konfrontasi, including various negotiation models and a co-operation with Soviet. Sukarno’s escalation of Konfrontasi following August 17 1965 made the US make their first major reconsideration of their policy and the basic premises for pursuing negotiations on Konfrontasi. The US chose to continue their policy of keeping contact with the army, despite the humiliations it might lead to, and in the months between August and March, Americans became prime targets of a sustained PKI campaign against Western cultural and economic presence in Indonesia.

While the US sought to continue the aid programs as far as possible within the limits given by internal and external pressure, Djakarta showed few signs of relaxing Konfrontasi after the June 1964 Tokyo summit. Although the British had been more moderate the last year, and "frequently have used their influence with the Tunku to urge moderation in his public statements," both the formal disagreement and the negative personal chemistry between the Tunku, "more British than the British," and the nationalist Sukarno showed few signs of improvement. The British position remained "a rather rigid one," which although understandable from US eyes, also "unquestionably exacerbated the situation." Several Afro-Asian countries had offered to mediate, including Japan. The US preferred that Thailand or an Afro-Asian Conciliation Committee (AACC) would lead any negotiations. 5and that Western countries and Japan remained aloof, and that the issue was kept out of the UN Security Council while Indonesian aggression remained low-scale. ⁶

In July, a stopover by Jones in Moscow en route to Washington raised the question in State and between the two ambassadors whether the US should seek Soviet cooperation to hinder escalation of Konfrontasi.⁷ On July 21, Jones and the US ambassador in Moscow, [first name?] Kohler, held a meeting to discuss the possibilities. The two agreed that "some areas of ‘objective’ coincidence of US-Soviet interests" existed in Indonesia, notably the avoidance of a major conflict over Malaysia and prevention of any further increase in Chinese influence. ⁸ However, the basic conflict between US and Soviet interests in the area, added by the pressures operating on Moscow, precluded even a tacit collaboration. If news of a cooperation reached Beijing, Djakarta or the PKI, it would be highly embarrassing both to the US and the Soviet. Any US attempts to aggravate Sino-Soviet tension were more likely to backfire than succeed. The Soviets, furthermore could not "afford the luxury of the relatively passive policy towards Indonesia of Stalin’s latter days," but had to protects its interest versus the proposed second Bandung-meeting and the neutral movement. ⁹ The Soviet ‘s prime objectives was to block PKI and Beijing influence and gain entrance to the second Bandung conference, and it "must do all it can do to develop leverage with Sukarno," the two ambassadors agreed. ¹⁰ Moscow "were obviously prepared to pay [a] higher price than we [do] to exert influence over Sukarno." ¹¹

The only interests the Soviet shared with the US in Indonesia were to avoid general war, since it would increase Beijing influence, and to limit PKI influence on Sukarno.¹² The Soviets still saw advantages in a protracted guerilla activity, since it made the Indonesian seek support militarily, and hence Moscow could compete with Beijing and Washington in leverage. ¹³ A settlement would lead to reduced Indonesian military dependence and a renewed US aid effort, both against Moscow interests. The Soviets seemed to have given up hopes of using the Soviet-friendly Aidit to regain influence in what they interpreted as an increasingly Beijing-orientated PKI with Aidit on the sidelines. The US ambassadors speculated that Moscow might soon seek to split PKI, possibly try to influence Sukarno into using the army to "crush Moscow’s principal local rival -- hopefully bringing down Peiping’s wrath on [Sukarno’s] head as a result." ¹⁴ However, as long as Moscow regarded Sukarno as the key to its own main ambitions, they would "obviously pay lip-service to Sukarno’s policies" and make a US-Soviet co-operation to halt Konfrontasi impossible ¹⁵

On August 10, 1964 Sukarno recognized North-Vietnam. On Independence day, August 17, Sukarno held his most anti-American anniversary speech to date. The "Tavip" speech, an acronym for "the year of living dangerously"¹⁶ was significant because the anniversary speeches held a prominent role in the expression of Indonesian policy. The speech "represented the most systematic, although not the most strident, expression of our growing differences with Indonesia," W. Bundy wrote to Johnson. ¹⁷ Also on August 17, Indonesian forces carried out a small, although ineffectual, landing on the mainland of Malaysia north of Singapore, constituting the first open attack on Malaysia with Indonesian forces and not directed on any of the disputed Bornean territories. ¹⁸ From August 17 until mid-September, Djakarta launched a series of forays on Malaysian mainland and performed its first air strike on September 1, using two American built Mitchell B-25s. British reports deemed the guerillas to be "very well armed" and using American arms. The discoveries were of US arms, although not unsurprising, embarrassing to the administration and led to some internal investigations on the origin, and was attributed mainly to old deliveries, the B-25s probably stemming from before 1951. ¹⁹

The Indonesian offensive introduced another phase in US withdrawal of aid to Indonesia. "These Indonesian actions, as a matter of foreign policy alone," Bundy continued, "should make it wise to adjust our aid policy."²⁰ Bundy recommended a sharp cut in the remaining aid, effective as soon as possible. Bundy recommended to halt the one C-130 plane under repair in the US, deliveries of vehicles and communication equipment to Mobrig, and all new PL-480 commitments. The two significant aid items remaining from the presidential determination under NSAM [309/278], was a $8 million advanced military communication systems, besides military training. ²¹ Bundy recommended the that communication equipment deliveries were halted. A few minor programs were allowed to continue, among them malaria eradication, non-military training under the civic action umbrella and conducted by AID, a conditional provision of landing equipment to Djakarta airport, civilian technical assistance, a few remaining Export-Import Bank loans and the Peace Corps. The slow-moving gradual phasing out of aid programs under AID did not need to be accelerated. The most noteworthy of the continued programs, were technical assistance and delivery of "non-sensitive equipment" to the National Police/Mobrig in order "to preserve US influence in this important power center". ²²

The question of continued military training were "the guts of the matter," Thomson memoed to Komer, and a shibboleth in aid policy. The Bundys, Komer and Thomson argued that the training was an important contact point with the army, forging ties between the US and Indonesian military. An abrupt ending of the training could also provoke reaction in Djakarta, endangering US presence and other programs. On the other side, the Tower amendment and House had specifically sought to halt this training, and continuing would be a provocation if discovered. W. Bundy formulated a way to postpone the decision, and hence allow continued training, with the observation that Indonesia were slowing down or stopping nomination of new candidates for US training. Bundy proposed to seek out the causes and results of this before making any decisions. Hence, the remaining candidates were allowed to finish their courses, although it seemed unlikely that Indonesia would provide candidates for the next year.

The aid cuts were approved by Johnson on August 31, after a well-prepared joint proposal from Rusk and McGeorge Bundy. However, McGeorge Bundy argued the importance of keeping some aid to Indonesia. "The fact that we we’re on a slippery slope with Indonesia makes it all the more important not to burn all our bridges [...]," Bundy wrote to Johnson. The US "could ill afford" to provoke another crisis in Southeast Asia, the US wanted to keep a few links, "however tenuous," to the Indonesian military, and there was still a slim chance of renewed negotiations on Konfrontasi. The final concern, more prominent in internal discussions than in the note to the president, was the concern that a US provocation could endanger the US investments in rubber and oil. Hence, the two reasons given for the presidential determination to continue the stripped aid program can be summarized in two points: To keep the foothold, and to avoid anti-US riots and actions by Sukarno endangering the foothold and US investments.

The Indonesian escalation led both to the issue being taken up in the UN Security Council and increased British impatience.²³ The British, worried that the Security Council would not condemn the Indonesian hostilities, informed the Americans by the beginning of September that they considered both commando-type raids to capture prisoners and air strikes against military targets in Indonesia. The prospect worried Secretary Rusk, since the British did not seem to have considered the Beijing reaction and possible escalation. Rusk compared the situation to Gulf of Tonkin incident on August 2, where the US had "immediately sent powerful reinforcements [...] to deal with the consequences of any effort by Hanoi or Peiping to escalate." ²⁴ Rusk’s feared that the British believed a retaliation could be one of "limited liability," and that the US hence would have to step in on the British side if escalation occurred. ²⁵ "We cannot give them a blank check and pick up the tab for escalation" without full reciprocal understanding, Rusk argued, and it was not certain that the US would be able to support the British "in an area where we have our hands full." ²⁶ë

In the Security Council, the US lobbied for a mild condemnatory resolution proposed by the Norwegians, which eventually won out 8 to 2 in votes, and then somewhat reluctantly vetoed by the Soviets.²⁷ On September 12, the London Embassy reported that the British had decided to launch air strikes against Indonesia, on an "automatic" basis, on the event of another Indonesian attack on Malaysian mainland Malaysia, and that the targets were set to be military centers in Java and Sumatra involved in Konfrontasi. The embassy reported that London were unlikely to seek US help, if nothing else so for reasons of national pride. However the British would inform Washington, and operational-level consultations with Pentagon had already started, to the possible embarrassment of the uninformed embassies.

The British actions put the US in a dilemma. On one side, Washington wanted to be consulted by the British, as the US had been consulted by Australia and New Zealand under the Anzus pact, and not only informed. But to be consulted, Washington most likely had to give unconditional support to the British actions, hence legitimizing and possibly aiding the very escalation the US sought to avoid, and the very reason for the US wanting to be consulted was to be able to hinder unwanted escalation and US involvement. The dilemma led to US examination of what possibilities the Anzus and Seato agreements provided for US rights to consultations, as well as a secret and informal talks with the British in London under Bill Bundy At the same time, the US refrained from taking part in a simultaneous round of secret Quadripartite talks in London on Southeast Asia, since they more easily could be exposed and hence put the US in a difficult position should the British attack Indonesia. In the US-British talks, W. Bundy made it clear that the US had to prepare for the unlikely event of Beijing intervention. While insisting that the British had to be able to deal with any escalation themselves, Bundy also reluctantly acceded that the US indeed would intervene on the British side, should for instance Beijing of Soviet action make it necessary.

Washington simultaneously initiated a campaign to convince Djakarta not to make any further attacks before the tempers had cooled. The US campaign on one side demonstrated the value of the remaining US contacts with Indonesia, on the other side it illustrated how this contact had been devaluated by last year’s aid curtailments. The US were indeed able to convey its message, that the US was not able to restrain the British and that a "major military showdown" was imminent. The Indonesians, in line with US signals, refrained from further attacks and hence avoided retaliation. However, the US had to convey the message carefully and through third parties when informing Sukarno, and had to carefully avoid raising Sukarno’s suspicion of the American origin of the information. Also, the Indonesian intelligence seemed to be well informed already on British intentions, making US information superfluous. The US also assumed that the Soviet, after its reluctant veto, had signaled its discontent more clearly to Djakarta, and with broader influence on Sukarno than the US.

The escalation of Konfrontasi consolidated the US decision on cutting aid of military value to Indonesia. However the basic policy of the administration was unchanged. It was the immediate prospect of open war and possible US involvement that made US deliveries of military politically impossible. On October 22 Rusk instructed the embassies that, "Our basic objectives continue to be to do what we can do to keep Indonesia out of communist control, to restrain Indonesian [...] excesses so they do not lead to second major military conflict in Southeast Asia, and to get through current period [...] without open break between US and Indonesia."

The August-September offensive had also led to altered interpretations of Konfrontasi in Washington. Until now, the US had based their tactics on the assumption that the dispute could be negotiated into a solution, if only the "right combination" was found.²⁸ The White House and State had until August still maintained some hope that Sukarno sought a way out of Konfrontasi without losing face, while other elements pressed for continued conflict. ²⁹ These analyses presupposed that there was some rationale based in power politics behind Indonesian aggression. When Konfrontasi escalated, Washington changed this presupposition, and concluded that Konfrontasi was an integral part of the Indonesian broad ideological confrontation. State now described the conflict as "one aspect of [the] broader problem of Indonesian hostility towards Western presence and influence in Southeast Asia." ³⁰ The Indonesians seemed to "have decided on (or perhaps drifted into) [a] new confrontation strategy, switching from narrow confrontation of Malaysia to [a[ more diffuse confrontation of the entire West." ³¹ Hence, the Malaysia problem was "essentially without ‘solution’ [...]," Rusk wrote in October 1964 ³² All negotiations were deemed to be fruitless until Indonesia changed its basic policies. Yet, State still saw it in US interest to divert the scope of Konfrontasi from its "dangerous military course" into time-consuming contacts and negotiations. ³³ However, given the obvious fruitlessness of negotiation, only "against the background [of] credible British military deterrent" could Djakarta be hindered from escalating the conflict, Rusk concluded. ³⁴ s

The " diffuse confrontation of the entire West" soon became a very concrete problem for the administration. In summer 1963, PKI had initiated a campaign against US cultural and economic presence in Indonesia. After the Tavip speech, the campaign escalated and US cultural and economic presence in Indonesia was attacked and gradually forced to retreat from Indonesia through demonstrations, labor union actions and government expropriations. The prime focus for PKI attacks were the USIS activities and primarily through the cultural centers and consulates in Medan, Surabaja and Jogjakarta besides Djakarta. There were regular demonstrations outside the centers, normally connected to a specific international event in which the US was deemed to be involved, such as Congo, Vietnam, Kashmir, Malaysia besides the general claims on US imperialism and US bribery of the police. At a few instances, the centers were invaded, windows broken and cars belonging to the staff were damaged. Demonstrators also attacked University professors and libraries connected with the US or carrying USIS material.

The demonstrations often had a strong Nefo-tone and appealed to the Afro-Asian nations to rise up against the Oldefo/Nekolim powers. The US deemed most of the demonstrations to be arranged by the PKI or connected leftist organizations, often with tacit government approval. There were some muslim-led demonstrations, for instance one on February 28, which protested the killing of Malcolm X. Likewise, Muslim organization at times turned anti-Indian demonstrations into Anti-American demonstrations during the Kashmir conflict. The US saw these demonstrations as partly caused by need to affirm anti-Western credentials. All in all, the American Embassy counted 32 significant demonstrations against US installments in Indonesia from August 10, 1964 to September 15 1965, the size ranging from 50 to 8000 participants.³⁵

The USIS and its missions also were impeded by various labor union actions. On October 12, 1964, the Postal Worker’s Union seized 20 parcels of USIS magazine shipments, initiating a boycott of all USIS mail. The boycott was relaxed on October 26, after US pressure and government intervention, only to be reinstalled on December 10 and then being relaxed again a few months later, although continuing to be an impediment on USIS business. On February 15, 1965, a labor union cut the Medan consulate’s electricity, while labor unions boycotted mail and cut off telex lines to Surabaya on March 22. During March, the power was also cut to a range of Djakarta installations, including the US Chancery, Embassy apartments, the Naval Attaché’s residence and the Indo-American association’s building. From August 7 to September 7 1965, the SOBSI-affiliated airport worker’s union initiated a boycott of US planes, targeting PanAm in specific. The boycott later went on and off, and was supplemented with a ban of US Embassy vehicles from the landing area, causing trouble for US staff internal travel in Indonesia. Embassy officers were at times searched on airports, and had to apply for licenses to internal air travels.

The cultural campaign also targeted semi-official and private American cultural expressions, and particularly Hollywood movies. American and British movies were banned or boycotted, and representatives from the 20^th Century fox and the American Moving Pictures Association (Mopix) harassed. Mopix representative William Palmer was singled out, first as a subversively minded American, then as a CIA agent and from March 1965 as the leader of CIA in Indonesia. On April 4, groups under the mark "communist intellectuals" seized his property in Tugu and villa in Puntjak On August 13, 1965, the houses of two American officials at the US Rubber Kisaran estate was searched and American records confiscated as illegal American cultural expressions.³⁶ On August 14, the Djakarta police confiscated "several thousand" American books and magazines burned from local shops and burned them at the police station.

The harassment of American installation with diplomatic status caused considerable embarrassment to the US. The US refrained from strong public reactions, but rather sent 38 diplomatic notes and used ambassador Jones in private to protest the violations. Outside the administration, the seemingly meek US attitude could seem either incomprehensible or cowardly. Hence, the press and parts of the Congress were highly critical of the US reactions and continued forbearance, putting pressure on the administration to be firmer on Sukarno and preferably to cut diplomatic ties rather than allow further insults.

Behind the US decision to tolerate the humiliations lay an internal disagreement over priorities in US policy. In different State Department sections, there were regularly voices calling for a break of relations and to evacuate Indonesia immediately. However, the White House and the Indonesia desk did not agree, and with corresponding regularity tried to calm the situation by having Johnson or McG. Bundy sending a "’don’t-panic’ signal" to the "panickers" in State – the last as late as in mid-September 1965.³⁷

The debate crystallized in September 1965, when Rusk dictated a general increase in priority given to maintaining the sanctity of legation, as a direct reaction to violations in Cambodia and Congo/Brazzaville besides Indonesia.³⁸ Thomson countered by formulating the White House’s contrasting view. Thomson argued for a modern "mature diplomacy" instead of puritanical insistence on the sacredness of legation, since the sacredness was "the outgrowth of Renaissance diplomacy and largely a new thought to the rest of the world." ³⁹ Although the US should try to maintain sanctity, one should refrain from "equating non-recognition of the principle with sin or immorality." ⁴⁰ Over-reaction could furthermore imply "handing over to Communist parties and adolescent governments a most effective means for rapidly reducing U.S. influence and removing the U.S. presence on a country to country basis." ⁴¹ Hence, the consequence of Rusk’s and the "amateur theologians’" policy, if followed with scrutiny, would mean that anyone with the ability to organize regular demonstrations could force the US to evacuate a country. ⁴²

Thomson further referred to the British as examples of how a mature power had developed a "considerably greater tolerance for such disorders and a resulting resilience and staying power."⁴³ The British had stayed in Djakarta, although their Embassy had been burned down by a mob, while Thomson assumed the US would have withdrawn in a similar situation "-- and this in itself is a sad comment on our relative immaturity as a great power," he concluded. ⁴⁴

Specifically for Indonesia, State proposed in September to close down the US consulates in East Java and Sumatra, besides closing down the Indonesian consulates in San Francisco and New York.⁴⁵ Thomson commented that "State’s various echelons are falling over each other in a race not to be the guy who failed to punch the Indos before they punched us," adding that State’s answer to the PKI pressure for pressing to close down the consulates was "to outsmart the Commies by closing them down ourselves!" ⁴⁶ Thomson attributed "such foolishness" to the Congo trauma, which was rather irrational, fear of being judged as soft and fear of Congress. Hence, State overlooked that the US had greater stakes in Indon and fear of Congress. Hence, State overlooked that the US had greater stakes in Indonesia than preserving American dignity and "teaching the natives good manners." Instead of firm withdrawal, The White House preferred "a posture of calm, tough patience and resilience". ⁴⁷

In actual policy, the US maintained a balance between the views of the White House and State from August 1964 to September 1965. On one side, the US sought actively to hinder a diplomatic break and tried to avoid actions that could be interpreted as giving in to PKI pressure. However, the US also chose to silently remove targets for PKI attacks, starting with the Peace Corps and USIS—both of which by the beginning of Mars had started to wind up their activities outside the Djakarta embassy.⁴⁸ The problem for the US was that for each target the US removed, the PKI turned their attention to another target, hence steadily increasing the Congressional and public pressure on the administration to sharpen reactions to Djakarta or break relations altogether.

Americans without diplomatic sanctity also had to confront impediments and harassment. Several missionaries in East Kalimantan, East Java and West Irian were harassed or branded as CIA agents, and some of them had to be evacuated. The sports coaches from the Peace Corps also met personal harassment and increasing impediments to their work, such as being banned from participating in competitions. Particularly in October 1964 and mind-January 1965, a series of demonstration targeted the Peace Corps specifically.

Reporters and correspondents could face trouble, for instance were US reporters at times boycotted by the wire service workers. The government at times banned specific reporters and magazines, like Time, from entering Indonesia after printing negative descriptions of Sukarno or Indonesia, while others received lengthy personal interviews with Sukarno, like Playboy Magazine. US reporters were also at times arrested, charged with subversive activities.

Besides the violations of diplomatic immunity, what concerned Washington most were the threats to US economic interests, in particular the rubber and oil installations. A few PKI-led demonstrations targeted American-owned companies, factories and rubber estates: In fall 1964 the police allowed demonstration against the Kisaran estate, on December 14 a warehouse at the Wingfoot Estate was burned and an observing Goodyear official "manhandled," while Stanvac and Caltex installations were painted over with slogans on February 23, 1965.

However, the gravest US concern lay in labor union seizures and government expropriation. On September 26, 1964 British-managed estates were put under "Dwikora"-control, including one owned by a Manhattan investment company. On February 26, 1965, all American estates in North Sumatra were placed under government control after labor union pressure, although not expropriated. Three days later, the oil companies Stanvac, Caltex and Pan American were put under temporary government control, the Goodyear rubber factory was expropriated another three days on. The next two months, a labor union seized the American Foreign Insurance Association and placed its business under the Ministry of Finance, earlier labor union occupations of Union Carbide’s battery factory, the assets of the National Cash Register Company and the assets of Singer Sewing Machines Company was converted to government expropriation. The threats to the oil companies was what eventually caused the second major US re-evaluation of policy.

Sukarno’s independence day speech and subsequent escalation of Konfrontasi initiated the first US reevaluation of policy. The prospect of being drawn into Konfrontasi on British side as well as the strength of Sukarno’s anti-American rhetoric made it political impossible to the few supplies of military equipment to the Indonesian army. However, the administrations still wished to use aid as its prime device for keeping contact with the army, and sought to delay the liquidation of a few key programs. The US also reevaluated the grounds for Konfrontasi, now partly adopting the British view that Konfrontasi was a part of a broad and diffuse campaign against the West. Throughout the next months, this campaign manifested itself in a broad and targeted campaign against US cultural and economic beachheads in Indonesia. When the campaign reached the level when it threatened US oil investment, the US initiated its second reevaluation through the Bunker mission.

Continuity or Change: The Bunker Mission and a New Ambassador

On July 23, 1965 Marshall Green arrived Djakarta, ending the 7-year tenure of Ambassador Jones. The replacement was perceived in Djakarta then and in most subsequent commentary as a turn toward a more hard-line US policy. However, the Jones’ replacement had been postponed for several months already, and its prime reason were Jones’ exhaustion and poor health. Jones signaled his wish to resign in summer 1964, the search for a replacement started in November, but no candidates were found willing or acceptable by all parties before April 1964, when deterioration in Jones performance had made further postponement of his replacement unwanted. The decision followed in the wake of the Bunker mission, which were the second major US reconsideration of policy, and initiated after the oil companies were threatened by union occupation and nationalization.

Frederick Bunnell argues that the Bunker mission and change initiated a phase of US low-posture policy towards Indonesia.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the low-posture stance reflects the bureaucracy’s and embassy staffs’ subjugation of Jones’ activism and accommodationist line. The phrase low-posture describes quite precisely the US conduct in Indonesia during 1965, and particularly from April to October 1965. However, the American low posture was not a major US policy, and not a the result of a major policy decision, but a tactical choice made to maintain the policy of having a foothold in Indonesia. Hence, the change of tactics toward low posture does not imply a change of policy, but rather how external pressures forced US to limit their activity and retract to fall back positions.

In many ways, Jones replacement was symbolic of a new stage in US-Indonesian relations. Jones had since his arrival been the symbol of the US policy of befriending the army and nurturing Sukarno with personal contact. There are also arguments supporting that Jones were replaced due to a Washington wish for a firmer ambassador in Djakarta, which would reflect an actual shift in policy behind the replacement. During 1964 and 1965, the tension between the embassy officers and Jones visibly increased. In Jones’ periods of absence, the embassy reporting reflected the more Sukarno-skeptical viewpoints of his staff, since chargé d’affaires Galbraith allowed more of these views to simmer through than Jones did. From January and onward, Jones was increasingly isolated from his staff in Djakarta, by March 1965 he "reported for himself alone and the Country Team evidently did not go along with him," McGeorge Bundy told George Ball.⁵⁰

Likewise, the close rapport and policy agreement that had existed between Harriman, Hilsman and Jones were not continued with the Assistant Secretary from March 1964, Bill Bundy, who had a more distant relationship to Jones.⁵¹ Furthermore, NSC aide Michael Forrestal, nicknamed "Jones’ rubberstamp" had less direct responsibility for Indonesia policy. The Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Marshall Green, recalls that "in 1964, Jones’ views and mine began to diverge [...]" ⁵² Jones did not seem to be up to his old self, and Ball among others aired during winter 1965 the thought that Jones had "gone soft," while Bill Bundy protested this.

Still, the discontent with Jones’ alone were until March 1965 of little significance for actual US policy and actions. The discontent with the "Jones-line" had been a constant factor in State, but had been largely subdued or ignored. There were until March 1965 few signs of actual distrust in Jones from the Bundys and Thomson, and Jones’ remained under their protection. Yet, also their discomfort was on the rise. In Washington, the outside pressure for getting tough on Sukarno and weariness of taking abuse from Djakarta made it gradually harder to defend the "Jones-way" of treating Sukarno with leniency, tacit pressure and elicitation in order to avoid the negative effects of an open confrontation. Jones continued to try to use his personal rapport with Sukarno to reopen negotiations on Konfrontasi, but with little success. In November 1964, Jones made a request for making a new initiative. This time, State Department’s reluctance was visible, and provoked an effort on Jones’ behalf from Komer and McGeorge Bundy in the White House,

As you know, I’ve been badgering FE not to give up on efforts to buy time here. We have little to lose and a lot to gain. But the FE experts seem tired of the game, and tend (probably with some reason) to discount Jones. They keep telling me we’ve tried all Jones remedies before, so why mount up again.

However I’m still playing devil’s advocate (the last Sukarno-lover). Even at risk of some caustic response from Bill [Bundy] about my badgering, you might stick in a needle to. ⁵³

Three weeks earlier, State had started the search for a replacement to Jones. Jones himself had expressed his wish to be relieved for some time, and had during the summer been sounded out for a new position as Chancellor of the East-West center in Honolulu. By November 9, it was clear that Jones would accept the offer, unless Harriman and Rusk demanded that he stay in Djakarta.⁵⁴ State correspondence and memos suggest that behind Jones’ decision was personal exhaustion and ill health, while Marshall Green recalls that Jones had started to have doubt on whether he and his methods would be to further benefit for the US. ⁵⁵

On the other side, State, the White House and the Djakarta embassy made efforts specifically to avoid the interpretation of Jones’ retirement as a shift towards a harder line. A protracted exchange on how to schedule the replacement of Jones while signaling continuance to Djakarta started in November and ended first when his replacement had arrived in Djakarta half a year later.

However, the immediate interpretation of Jones retirement outside the administration was that the US would get tough on Indonesia. The reaction among the right-wing Indonesians and Western diplomats in Djakarta were mostly negative, "Jones’ departure is the best news PKI has had in years, ", the French ambassador relayed.⁵⁶ A group of Indonesian officials offered in reaction to petition Johnson not to accept Jones’ resignation, while the leftwing press "cheered" the pending departure "which the masses have long demanded." ⁵⁷ Likewise, Sukarno tried to convince Jones of staying, urging him to stay two more years while waving all Jones’ arguments for leaving aside "as relatively unimportant when it came down to fundamental matter of maintaining a friendly relationship between two important countries." ⁵⁸

Sukarno’s urges were not necessarily interpreted as a sign in favor of Jones in Washington, neither was French sympathy. Still, the resignation was generally seen in Djakarta as a left wing victory due to PKI pressure. In Washington, outside the inner circles of the White House and State, the reactions to Jones’ resignation were mostly positive, there were expressions of content or more widespread signs of silent relief that a source of US embarrassment abroad were about to disappear. Hence, the hard-liners and the Djakarta left-wing’s views on Jones’ departure coincided, while the administration’s views were mixed.

The selection process to find a new ambassador supports that State and the White House did not want the change to be seen as a shift towards a harder line. Bill Bundy’s first candidates had been Gale McGee and Jake Beam, but both were soon unavailable or discarded. The preferred candidate of Bill Bundy, Robert Komer, and McGeorge Bundy then became Ambassador Wilson Wyatt. Wyatt had led the oil negotiations in 1963, the most successful US diplomatic effort versus Indonesia in the later years. At the time, he had also established some personal rapport with Sukarno and had the image of being inside the personal circle of Kennedy, which still might hold some emotional appeal to Sukarno. However, "the Oval Room put the kibosh on [Wyatt]," for undiscovered reasons.⁵⁹ Although the Bundys and Komer initiated a rehearing, Wyatt remained unacceptable. ⁶⁰

The next candidate from State and White House was Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who had led the West Irian negotiations. Like Wyatt, Bunker was a well-reputed candidate who clearly would symbolize continuance from Jones, and he had the same personal rapport and Kennedy-association with Sukarno as Wyatt had. Bunker also checked out with the British. However, family considerations and health made Bunker reluctant to accept a new post abroad. Also, Bunker had to be available for eventual negotiations over Vietnam, which could interfere with work in Djakarta.⁶¹

From December to February, various high level administration officials, probably including the president, tried to talk Bunker into taking the post. "Djakarta was [an] even more important post than Saigon (for diplomacy at least) over the next few years," Komer argued to Bunker, and that he "couldn’t think of a more crucial sport or a better man for it." In the end, however, Bunker chose to reject the position for health reasons. By March 18,1965, Jones’ successor remained unclear. With Bunker uncertain, the selection committee now had Samuel Berger as their clear candidate.⁶²

On March 14, the attacks on US oil installations in Indonesia made the US situation critical. The threats against the oil companies caused fervent action in Washington and a thorough re-evaluation of US policy initiated by Under Secretary George Ball. A series of meetings between Ball and executives of involved US companies started in early March.⁶³ By March 14, the oil companies were under direct threat, and Ball concluded with CIA director John McCone that the Indonesian "grab will go forward" and hence, the US "ought to get out." ⁶⁴ The next few days, Ball held meetings with the oil companies executives about the plan to "liquidating the oil business." ⁶⁵ Ball then tried to bring Johnson into a decision through National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, "The seriousness of our being pushed clear out of Indonesia is extremely disturbing," Ball pointed out to Bundy, and referred to Indonesia’s size and strategic location. ⁶⁶ "In the long term political term it may be more important to us than South [Viet-Nam], and therefore the President should have a chance to look at this." ⁶⁷

Meanwhile, the public US reactions to the seizures and expropriations were modest. The US kept a line of moderated protests, limiting their official reactions to diplomatic notes. Jones personally protested to Sukarno, Subandrio, Saleh and other officials, and negotiated the return of seized assets, at times with success, but most often to little avail.

Ball’s campaign for a re-evaluation succeeded, and on March 18, 1965 he delivered to Johnson a finished and already organized proposal with Rusk’s support. "Our relations with Indonesia are on the verge of falling apart," Ball wrote.⁶⁸ The PKI were increasingly dominating Sukarno, the army had "problems of internal cohesion," the management of the rubber plantations had been taken over and the oil companies were in imminent danger. ⁶⁹ Rusk and Ball also felt it "essential to get a clear, objective reading of the situation." ⁷⁰ Ball thought Bunker was the ideal candidate to be sent on a mission to evaluate the situation.. The embassy reports were not sufficient given the "hard decisions that may be required over the next few weeks," and Jones were "tired and worried," Ball wrote to Johnson, only hinting at the current disarray in the embassy. "[...] He has done everything possible to advance American interests through his close personal relations with Sukarno. But that line seems pretty well played out." ⁷¹

The immediate decision to be made after the Bunker mission was what new ambassador to send to Indonesia: whether the US should send Bunker, the best candidate, leave the post vacant as an expression of dissatisfaction or send someone less prestigious than Bunker Bunker’s mission became twofold: To make an evaluation of the situation, but also to try to get a commitment from Sukarno to stabilize the oil situation. Bunker would use his own prestige with the Indonesians, stemming from the West Irian negotiations, as well as a letter from Johnson to try to calm Sukarno.⁷²

Bunker went to Djakarta immediately, only stopping over in Washington from Vermont to brush up. During the two weeks in Djakarta, Bunker met three times with Sukarno, delivering a personal letter from Johnson to Sukarno on the first occasion. Bunker also talked with Nasution and other officials. The talks with Sukarno lead to no significant results, beyond the contributions they made to Bunker’s analyses. Bunker returned his written report on April 23. On April 26, Johnson and Rusk discussed the findings with Bunker, and approved of Bunker’s recommendations unchanged and without much discussion. The exceptions were Bunker’s recommendation of Hank Byroade as new ambassador and some discontent over Bunker’s recommendation of continued technical assistance to Indonesian Universities although State explicitly had told Bunker that option was ruled out.⁷³

The Bunker report basically confirmed US assessment of Indonesia and the existing policy.⁷⁴ Indonesia remained an important country mostly due to its potentials and strategic location, and was not seen as a major power as of now. However, Indonesia had "significant influence throughout the uncommitted world" and had moved considerably leftwards due to deft PKI use of Nefo/Oldefo-ideology to eliminate all opposing ideologies by branding them as betrayals to the nation. ⁷⁵ PKI had mostly through skilled political maneuvering become the only civilian political force of influence apart from Sukarno, even though the other forces combined collectively represented a majority of all politically conscious Indonesians. Although the army had lost political power since the early sixties, it still "retained the physical power to overcome any rival political force." ⁷⁶ However, they would never move against Sukarno, largely because they saw him as the "embodiment of the revolution." ⁷⁷ Although the army sae Indonesia’s role in the world more realistically than Sukarno, they were part of the same revolutionary, romantic movement. They were hence striving with the same problems of colonial inferiority complex, lack of competent bureaucracy and poor organization which was the heritage from the neglect and harshness under the Dutch colonial rule, and which was a main factor behind Sukarno and Djakarta’s continuing need to demonstrate importance in foreign affairs, at the expense of development. Furthermore, the military were subject to ideological pressure from Sukarno and PKI, and could not oppose the Nefo-ideology while retaining their positions of power in the government. Their plan was hence to play along until Sukarno died, while building up internal cohesion to face the following struggle for power with the PKI. ⁷⁸

Bunker foresaw a strained relationship with Indonesia for considerable time ahead, even if the Malaysia crisis was solved. Sukarno’s had told Bunker that behind the strained relationship lay US support to Malaysia, US involvement in Vietnam and US presence and bases in the vicinity. Bunker however concluded that other and more fundamental factors were behind: The Indonesian ambition to solidify the NEFOS against the OLDEFOS and Sukarno’s ambition lead the NEFOS while the US were defined as leader of the Nekolim/OLDEFO countries. Furthermore the influence of PKI and Sukarno’s proclaimed Marxism were hinders, as was Sukarno’s priority of national unity over economic development, Sukarno’s confidence in his ability to bend the PKI to his will and finally, Sukarno’s mystical belief in his own destiny.⁷⁹ Hence, Bunker reaffirmed the change of analysis made in October 1964.

The American hopes, Bunker concluded, lay mainly in the military and the moderate Muslim political organizations, and to some extent in other moderate elements that now were inactive. Isolated clashes between Muslim organizations and PKI had already started in Java and Sumatra. However, the military also posed some problems, since it supported Konfrontasi. Yet the army did not see it in its interest to lose militarily in Konfrontasi, and would prefer a settlement rather than face a defeat which would leave them vulnerable to PKI. Neither was it in the U.S. interest to see the Indonesian military defeated by the British.⁸⁰

The situation demanded that the US continued to withdraw, so that the army could act without the negative effects of being associated with the US, Bunker concluded.⁸¹ The weakest spot for the US was its large and wide presence in Indonesia, mostly through consulates and USIA stations, which provided the PKI with targets for attack. The defense of these targets were embarrassing to the army and the policy, since it associated them with the imperialists. ⁸² Hence "US visibility should be reduced so that those opposed to the communists and extremist may be free to handle a confrontation, which they believe will come, without the incubus of being attacked as defenders of the neo-colonialists and imperialists," Bunker wrote. ⁸³ "Indonesia basically have to save itself. U.S. policy should be directed toward creating conditions which will give the elements of potential strength the most favorable condition for confrontation." ⁸⁴ Bunker assumed the confrontation would follow the death of Sukarno, since "no force in this country can attack him, nor is there evidence that any significant group would want to do so." ⁸⁵

Bunker’s statement hence reflects a surrender in the ideological warfare. The USIA posts could not be defended because PKI control over ideology had made defense embarrassing, even though the defenders sympathized with the US and were physically stronger than PKI. Thus, US actual policy in Indonesia was determined by what their sympathizers were able to do without being publicly embarrassed by connection to the US. The best support the US could give to the army, Bunker deemed, was by spring 1965, simply to stay away.

However, this did not imply that the US should break contact with Indonesia, which was exactly what PKI and possibly Sukarno wanted the US to do. Bunker provided a clear and short list of policy recommendations: The first was to maintain a presence in Indonesia. The ongoing program of keeping contact with friendly figures, both of current and potential importance, were to be continued as far as possible. Furthermore, since US-Indonesian relations primarily depended on what Sukarno wanted them to be, the US should to the extent possible, continue the effort to work with Sukarno and maintain a dialogue between him and the President. On the other side, punitive actions from the US or "public castigation of the Sukarno regime" only tended to intensify US problems in Indonesia, Bunker observed, and hence should be avoided.⁸⁶ The US should use "the agency of third countries" where possible to "oppose Indonesia’s efforts to turn the Afro-Asia-Latin American countries into an American bloc". ⁸⁷ Due to the "overriding obsession" with national unity with practically all Indonesian, the US should also avoid to involvement in any efforts to split off Sumatra or other areas. ⁸⁸ Finally ,the US should continue to avoid direct involvement in both the military and diplomatic aspects of the Malaysia problem. ⁸⁹

Hence, the recommendations, like the analyses, conceded that it was little the US was able to do actively, besides continuing to keep a presence in order to keep a minimum of contact with its local allies. Any US actions was seen to worsen the situation for the military and the right wing, and firm reactions from the US were feared to provoke the unwanted complete break in relations. The various regional rebels were discarded as allies, since they were in opposition to national unity. Although the US would try to oppose the Nefo-ideology and organizations through other countries, it was little the US could do directly.⁹⁰

There was however one specific action the US could take, and that was to intensify the US information program under the Embassy aegis. The program, as before aimed at "keeping a window open for U.S. influence with Indonesian leaders, particularly those among the youth."⁹¹ Apart from this minor program, the only new element in US policy and was an Emergency and Evacuation plan: From April, Indonesia was to be considered in phase one of formal emergency and evacuation planning, implying a slow evacuation of all non-vital personnel , freeze of travels of " dependents" ⁹² as well as constant review of security. However, the plan was on a need-to-know-basis, so only those actually involved in evacuation would know of its implementation.⁹³

[missing part] decisions rare. Only after the post-Tavip offensive in Konfrontasi and the March threats to US oil companies did Indonesia rise to Presidential level, and then only as a result of a carefully concerted efforts from those directly under Rusk and Johnson. The concept of demonstrating military strength through the 7^th fleet’s role as the real military neighbor of Indonesia also connected policy in Vietnam and Indonesia. Notably, Guy Pauker argued that US should use concerted displays of strength in Vietnam and Indonesia, in order to contain Indonesian expansionism and break the Djakarta-Beijing alliance. Similar arguments were aired in the White House. Displays of strength also were performed in Indonesia, through regular, but minor "mare nostrum transits" through Indonesian waters. However, what triggered these displays was the more imminent Indonesian threat to inhibit US and British military transits through its waters. The Indonesian threat coincided in time with an increasing need for free transits due to Vietnam and the Indian-Pakistani war.

In retrospect, Rusk and other key players in the administration argued that the American firm stance in Vietnam had significantly influenced the events in Indonesia in US favor. However, it is hard to find evidence in the US policy towards Indonesia which supports that the US explicitly used the military involvement in Vietnam in their choice of policy towards Indonesia. It is more probable that the stated direct connection between firmness in Vietnam and the Indonesian army’s resolve in 1965–66 is a rationalization made in hindsight to legitimize US involvement in Vietnam. Note that this does not imply that the US did not think of Indonesia when discussing policy towards Vietnam, only that they did not directly implicate Vietnam when discussing policy towards Indonesia. That an explicit connection is lacking in Indonesia discussion may have been because there was no need to discuss the connection when discussing Indonesia—either because it was a self-evident connection, because the concerns were compartmentalized, or that the connection did not exist. It is beyond the scope of this treatment to suggest which one is most likely. Given Indonesia’s status as an important domino, it however likely that Indonesian concerns did play a role in US policy towards Vietnam, and as noted, evidence suggests that the connection exited at a speculative level. Furthermore, reports from Djakarta indicated that the connection between US policies in Vietnam and Indonesia was made, or used, by the Indonesian left-wing and Sukarno, and hence was a connection the US had to relate to in their Indonesia policy.

The most visible direct influence of US involvement in Vietnam on the US policy towards Indonesia hence remained the influence it had on the bureaucratic processes. Vietnam consumed the top-level policy makers’ time and efforts, and hence Indonesian issues were delegated one level down both in State and the White House. This strengthened the US tendency to rely on existing polices, rather than seek new initiatives. Only after considerable efforts and forced by external events, were those in administration dealing with Indonesia able to convince Johnson and Rusk to make time even for re-evaluations of US policy towards Indonesia.

Losing the Army

Peter Dale Scott, Kathy Kadane and others have argued that US weapon supplies continued after the adthe administration’s termination of military equipment sales in September 1963 and despite the subsequent Congressional prohibitions. "[...]a public image was created that under Johnson ‘all United States aid to Indonesia was stopped’, a claim so buttressed by misleading documentation that competent scholars have repeated it," Scott states.¹²⁸ Scott agrees that the publicly known deliveries under MAP was discontinued but that a covert delivery of 200 Aero-Commanders were arranged by the US Air Force, involving funding through dividends which the US oil companies paid to the army-controlled oil company led by Ibn Sutowo. ¹²⁹ Also, a military communication system delivered by the US in 1965 was essential for coordinating Suharto’s actions on September 30 and October 1. The principal foundation for Scott’s claim is found in records of testimonies of the 1968 Church Committee Hearings. Playing central roles in Scott’s outlined scheme were various independent US and Japanese officials and businessmen, informally connected through various academic and governmental institutions, besides Suharto and the civic action program. ¹³⁰

The covert and private nature of the deliveries Scott outlines and their reliance on independent agents rather than White House and State policy defines the actual deliveries on the fringes the primary scope of this treatment. Leaving the specifics of the alleged deliveries aside, a detailed treatment of the administration’s actions involving weapon supplies to Indonesia is still called for. The claims on US weapon deliveries have been important in the argumentation for the possible US involvement in the planning of the 30. September coup and subsequent events in Indonesia. Hence, it needs to be established if such deliveries were in accord or discord with White House and State policy and actions, and whether it is likely that such deliveries could have occurred without the White House or State’s knowledge.

A first look suggests that such deliveries were opposed to policy as well as external pressure: The two major policy re-evaluations had led to the conclusion that the Indonesian army no longer wanted US supplies, even though the US wanted to extend aid for contact purposes. In addition, the pressure from the British and Congress against aid combined with vigilance made US support to the army difficult. Hence, the situation suggests that examples of the interplay between Congress, London, the army and the administration also is needed to outline the background. Then we can establish whether the US wanted to support army subversion militarily and if it were able to do so.

There some weighty arguments against Scott’s theories. An extensive range of recently declassified State Department internal documents and correspondence on defense items shows that the State Department very consciously filtered out supplies with any aggressive potential. The main consideration behind was the British, and the winter 1964 agreement between Great Britain on the United States, where the US received British support in South Vietnam in return for US support to the British in Malaysia. As documents repeatedly show, the US would not endanger this agreement. The US commitment to the agreement was strengthened by the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam, which during 1964 undoubtedly had distanced the Indonesia-Malaysian conflict in priority. It is unlikely that the US would endanger their commitment in South Vietnam by provoking the British over Indonesia.

Several incidents support the argument that it was the British concerns that eventually halted aid to Indonesia. The most controversial Indonesian export item on the State Department’s desk concerned spare parts and maintenance for the ten Indonesian Lockheed C-130 "Hercules" aircrafts, all due to be serviced. The aircrafts had been used to transport personnel to the borders of Sarawak and Sabah, and most likely would be active in an escalated conflict. Hence they were offensive weapons and on the blacklist. On the other side, the planes had been delivered with commitments on maintenance, and spare parts from the C-130s were easily available elsewhere. The Indonesian army and Air Force would not appreciate being denied parts, Indonesia and others would perceive the US as a promise-breaker, and turn to Soviet alternatives. The question was hence also strategic: The threat of withholding spare parts would become an asset if the US got into actual conflict: It was better that the backbone of Indonesians troop transport was C-130s later, and that the US then could withhold parts, than that earlier boycotts had forced the Indonesians into relying on new Soviet AN-12 aircrafts, over which the US would have no control in an emergency.¹³¹

The Indonesian had requested spare parts in fall 1963, but State’s decision were deferred until the Lockheed application for export license arrived in the end of January 1964, suggesting that two aircrafts were flown to the US for repair, while eight should be repaired in Indonesia. The repairs were for corrosion in the fuel tank – a guarantee issue—and spare parts like engines. One plane was already on its way to the World Fair in New York, when State Department decided that they had no choice but to turn down the requests for parts. However, the corrosion problems could possibly be fixed, but the final decision were deferred in hope for improvement in Konfrontasi after the Robert Kennedy mission, and the American technical personnel remained in Indonesia. The one plane already in the States, was allowed a full maintenance.

Meanwhile, the British notified the Americans repeatedly of their discontent with the possible repairs, and in April, the issue became too hot to defer further. The State Department had to choose between acceding to the, in US eyes, slightly irrational British requests or the strategic advantages by supplying the spare parts. William Bundy and Marshall Green of the Far East office proposed that the export licenses be granted, but then suspended indefinitely, and hence serve as reminder to the Army besides being a compromise. The European office disagreed: "The British will undoubtedly feel that the agreement reached during Sir Alec’s recent visit, whereby we would support British policies toward Malaysia and they would support our policies in South Viet Nam, applies to the C-130s," Assistant Secretary William Tyler wrote to Rusk, "From the standpoint of our relations with British I do not see how we can go ahead with the overhaul and spare parts program."¹³²

The Bundy/Green-proposal was not approved, and eventually, the European office and the full-termination view won out in State. In mid-September, Indonesia escalated Konfrontasi and the State Department informed Lockheed that all repairs were to be terminated, with the exception of the single plane already in the States.¹³³ The subsequent months, the State Department co-operated with the British in monitoring possible indirect deliveries of parts to the Indonesian. Some attempts to smuggle parts through Japan and Hong Kong and other places were intercepted. 134In august 1965, intelligence reports concluded that the Indonesians had finally been able to get hold of parts from Pakistan, to US discontent and in violation of the US-Pakistani agreement of 1954. ¹³⁵

While the US did halt C-130 repairs, they also supplied a few other aircrafts and spare parts to the Indonesians. On July 28, 1964, Assistant Secretary William Bundy approved selling parts to the Indonesian Air Force’ seven Albatross aircrafts and some T-6 trainer aircrafts, after making sure that they had no military capability.¹³⁶ The US had promised three "Grand Commander luxury jets" to the Indonesian military as well, and the last two were dispatched after the termination of military aid. The dispatches were made through Sola Airport, Norway. Being poorly disguised as civilian aircrafts, the Lockheed C-140 Jetstar planes were exposed as Indonesian military aircrafts on May 14 and August 2, 1965, causing some notes in the press and British discontent. The press noting the incidents concluded in August that the US still supplied military parts to the Indonesians. The US embassy in London countered that the $2million planes were luxury jets, and that it would "cost more to remove [the] bar out of those little executive aircraft [sic]" ¹³⁷ and make them military usable than the plane was worth. State Department documents show that the planes, although radar-equipped, were not intended as offensive weapons: One of them was for Sukarno’s personal use, while the other two were for use by Cabinet officers. All were maintained by the Indonesian Air Force VIP Squadron. "In our view" Desk Officer R. J Morris wrote to the Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, "[the] Aerocommander is a toy and not much else." ¹³⁸ The sale of the aircrafts were most likely approved because it was a free and military insignificant gesture to the Indonesian leadership, similar to the Sikorsky helicopter given to Sukarno in 1961, and could provide some minor compensation to the cut-off of all significant aid items. ¹³⁹ On the other side, State Department were skeptical of supplying spare parts to Sukarno’s helicopter, not functioning from 1964. ¹⁴⁰

The US reactions to allied sale of equipment to Indonesia support the image of US policies as strict. An Italian decision to sell forty 105mm guns to Indonesia made the British send strong protests in March 1964. The US reacted by stating their policy to Rome, emphasizing several times that they had sent no items with offensive capabilities whatsoever to Indonesia after September 1963. Although they would not pressure the Italians to refrain from selling, the implication was that the US rather that Rome cancelled the deal. In the end, the Italians terminated the deal.¹⁴¹ On another Italian issue, Indonesian Desk Officer Edward Ingraham told the British that State only could stop the Italian subsidiary of Willys Jeep from selling 1200 jeeps to Indonesia if the jeeps were actually manufactured in USA, since the US "export license controls clearly covered jeeps manufactured in the US," but " there was little could do about jeeps manufactured in a third country." Ingraham then agreed to check informally with Willys. ¹⁴²

On September 4, 1965, the US expressed doubts to the Dutch on whether they could allow American Fairchild engines to be used in 120 Fokker F27 ("Friendship") aircrafts the Dutch had agreed to sell the Indonesians, although the September 30 coup pre-ceded an actual decision.¹⁴³ The US were more alarmed by discovering Japanese sale of civilian Kappa missiles to Indonesia in March 1965, and the US both worked against further sales and tried to hinder the missiles from being developed into surface-to-surface missiles similar to the Lambda class—which "would have serious politico-military repercussions in the [Far East] region," and made State "concerned over possible strengthening of Indonesian military potential." ¹⁴⁴ Also, the West-German supply of 15 Dornier Aircrafts, light arms and American-style helmets in 1965 disconcerted State Department—although the US could understand the West-German deal which sold arms to forestall Indonesian recognition of East-Germany. The Germans commented that "the new measures" from the US "might hurt the Indonesian Army most," and turn the only friendly element in Indonesia into using communist sources." ¹⁴⁵ The Germans offset the negative effect towards the British by selling 300 machine guns to Malaysia. ¹⁴⁶

The US-based training programs for the Indonesian army and police (Mobrig) were also radically downsized during 1964 and 1965, partly due to the lack of Indonesian candidates. "As of late April 1964, there were 187 Indonesian armed forces personnel training in the United States,"¹⁴⁷ Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Robert E. Lee, wrote Senator John G. Tower, "plus 40 police personnel." ¹⁴⁸ About 25% were training under the civic action program, and no Indonesians in the US academies were taking counterinsurgency courses after 1963, nor courses in "guerilla warfare or ranger tactics." ¹⁴⁹ In December 1964, Lee reported to Tower that only 28 armed forces personnel and 2 police officers remained in the US, all of which underwent "career courses," that is administrative and technical courses. ¹⁵⁰ In 1965, no police officers were enlisted in the US academies. However, some civic action training, according to State papers of non-military nature, was continued in Indonesia until September 1965, when the final groups of MILTAG advisors left Djakarta.

The US also closely monitored the strength of the Indonesian military and military shipments. Most worrying to the US was the aspect of an Indonesian missile arsenal and possible nuclear weapons. In addition to the Japanese missiles, a range of intelligence reports in 1965 suggested that Soviet missiles were being transported to and positioned in Sumatra. The missiles were dubbed "Cubans," and reports suggested that they not only were the same class as those placed in Cuba during the Cuban crisis, but that some of them were the same actual missiles.¹⁵¹ Indonesian Brigadier General Hartono claimed in July 1965 that ground-.to-ground missiles were tested in West-Java, all "capable of destroying Singapore and Kuala Lumpur by pressing a button." ¹⁵²

Hartono also claimed that Indonesian would detonate its first atomic bomb after the Afro-Asian conference in November 1965.¹⁵³ The speculations around a possible Indonesian nuclear device were abundant in Djakarta and Washington throughout August and September. The US concluded with the Japanese that the Indonesians only would be capable of detonating a device with help from Beijing. On one hand, the Chinese were now ready to make an under-water test, where an Indonesian remote island would be the ideal place. West Irian and Nentawai in West Sumatra were reported to be the places Indonesia had in mind. Intelligence was supplemented by the research of a local UPI correspondent who set a specific date in July for when "atomic material" allegedly had been shipped into Djakarta, and the dates for detonation was said by different sources to be October 5, 1965 or May 20, 1966. Sukarno’s August 17 Independence day speech suggested a soon upcoming detonation. The US cooperated closely with Japanese intelligence on verifying the information, and the Japanese seemed to consider the threat possible, backed by reports from centrally placed Japanese informants. Also, it seemed clear the if the political will was there from both Beijing and Djakarta, it was technically possible to detonate a device, the US concluded.

The US remained however doubtful to that a detonation would occur. It was not likely that Beijing would allow transports of Chinese devices on foreign soil, particularly given the reputation Beijing had for secrecy. There seemed to be little gain to the Chinese by exploding a device for the Indonesians. For the Indonesians, the whole effect of the detonation relied on absolute silence on any Chinese involvement—any public knowledge of Beijing involvement would most probably backfire on Djakarta. Lack of deep water harbors in the islands west of Sumatra also made detonation there difficult.

In Washington, the Congress and the press coupled the atomic device with the upcoming renewal of the American nuclear technical assistance to Indonesia. The Americans had under Eisenhower’s 1960 "Atoms for Peace"-program furnished Indonesia with a 250kW Triga MkII nuclear reactor from General Atomics, similar to what 25 other countries had received.¹⁵⁴ The small reactor, operative from October 1964, had miniscule capability of producing weapons-grade plutonium, and no extraction facilities existed to utilize what could be produced. ¹⁵⁵ About 2.3 kilograms of U-235 uranium ¹⁵⁶ were leased from the US to Indonesia to run, and was supposed to keep the reactor going until the 1972–73 on full capacity. In august 1965, the reactor ran only at 25% of capacity. The reactor was under regular US inspection, and although the administration insisted to transfer the supervision to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Indonesians had preferred the Americans to stay due to negative experiences with the IAEA, besides that the Indonesian withdrawal from the UN might create further problems with the IAEA. US reasons for renewing the agreement included safety for the fissionable material, the difficulties a withdrawal of the leased uranium would cause, and the benefits from keeping contact with the Indonesian scientific community. ¹⁵⁷ A 5-years extension of the atomic energy agreement for five years was agreed upon on September 23, 1965 after four weeks of negotiations.. ¹⁵⁸

The reactor, located at the Bandung Technical Institute, had first "sparked some adverse public and congressional comment" in October 1964, when criticality was reached and Sukarno announced that nuclear weapons capability were in sight. To avoid further criticism the administration had tried to keep the US involvement low-key and downplayed the dedication ceremony on February 8, 1965, and delayed the subsequent hand over of the US half of the reactor’s cost. The risk was that calming Congress meant irritating Sukarno, creating a difficult balance.¹⁵⁹

In the first days of August 1965, Congress controversy finally arose over the delayed US $350.000 share. Despite the administrations assurances of military insignificance and that the commitment stemmed from 1961, Congressman Broomfield and others protested that the US funded the reactor while Djakarta claimed nuclear weapons capability.¹⁶⁰ From the administrations’ viewpoint, the connection between the Bandung reactor and possible nuclear weapons announcement seemed miniscule: Not only were the reactor too small for weapons use and under US supervision, but the Soviets were in the progress of supplying competing reactors in Indonesia, while the Chinese would hardly use an American reactor instead of their own for weapons purposes, if nothing else so for the poor impression it would make on the Indonesians involved. Also, not to pay the $350.000 to Indonesia could be costly. ¹⁶¹ The Indonesians had fulfilled all their recent commitments to the US, and a $13 million Indonesian repayment soon was due. To halt a minor US payment now endangered the major Indonesian repayment coming up. Furthermore, the reactor payment was the last remaining unfulfilled commitment "left over from the period when we could co-operate usefully with the Indonesians," and hence would "wipe the slate clean." ¹⁶² Nevertheless, the congressional outcry over the payment was symptomatic for the close surveillance the leading anti-aid members of Congress held over US government activities in Indonesia, and the domestic limits put on the administration’s programs in Indonesia. ¹⁶³

The administration was further concerned by the Indonesian army’s willingness to cooperate and align itself with governments which the US regarded as rogue or hostile. Indonesia had since 1964 supplied arms to other Afro-Asian nations and offered military training in Indonesia. Among those accepting training or parts were North-Vietnam, North Korea, and neutralist Laotian forces under General Kong Le.¹⁶⁴ Cambodia and Burma, the "waifs and strays" in the White House jargon, were reported to have sent fighter pilots for MiG-17 training in Indonesia. ¹⁶⁵ "This is [a] test case for our lighthouse policy which we will carry through with all consequences," General Yani stated when the first contingent of 120 Laotians arrived in Bandung on August 27, 1965. Major General Kusno Utomo, according to the US report, stressed that "Laotians, Indonesians and all Nefo peoples had [a] common enemy, ‘international colonialism’, and that ‘Indo[nesian] people, including Armed Forces, will faithfully assist [...] to crush American imperialism in order to unite Laotian territory.’" ¹⁶⁶

A February 1965 suggestion to establish a mutual defense pact between Indonesia and Pakistan worried Washington particularly, since it would "create problems" for the US beyond Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.¹⁶⁷ To increased US concern, Indonesia supplied Pakistan with MiG fighters and Komor class missile boats from September to December 1965, in support of the open war against India, and probably in violation with the original sales agreement with the Soviet. ¹⁶⁸ The US generally interpreted the military aid and training programs as an Indonesian attempt to spread its Nefo ideology to neutral countries who "still tend erroneously to consider [Indonesia] as one of themselves". ¹⁶⁹ The support to the Pakistani was more complex, but also here, Sukarno’s wish to include Pakistan in the Djakarta-Hanoi-Peiping-Pyongyang-axis of core Nefo-countries were deemed central, besides the army’s wish to demonstrate "Muslim brotherhood." ¹⁷⁰

All in all the modest Indonesian military aid and training programs were deemed to be of little strategic significance, but they were important tokens of Indonesia’s political direction, motivation and increasing hostility. State commented to an April 1965 display of close ties with North Koreas that it "exemplif[ied the] kind of behavior by Indonesian Government which significantly complicates our effort [to] maintain even [the] existing level of political and aid relations with Indonesia, against generally adverse Congressional and public opinion in U.S,"¹⁷¹ State assumed that although it was primarily a gesture made in return for Korean support to Konfrontasi, it was probably also an intentional provocation to the US. ¹⁷² "Undoubtedly," Ambassador Green concluded, the Indonesian military aid efforts were the beginning of a more extended Indonesian program along similar lines, which could cause much trouble for the US if not stopped. ¹⁷³

The administration still decided to forward one major item of military value to the Indonesia army: an advanced communication equipment. In 1961, the US had agreed as a part of MAP to furnish the Indonesian army with a tropospheric scatter system from Philco, providing encrypted point-to-point radio communication. Equipment for 12 ground sites were bought and held in US storage pending building of the sites. By mid-64 three sites, Djakarta, Bandung and Palembang were about to be finished, but after the August-September 1964 escalation of Konfrontasi, the US decided to withhold the equipment. The next months all MAP deliveries were wound up until they all had ended by February 1965, including the communications equipment. However, the Bunker mission in April 1965 reiterated the value of keeping some aid items "in order to retain special ties with the Army," and particularly with General Yani.¹⁷⁴ Bunker suggested to sell the radio equipment for the three finished sites through commercial channels. ¹⁷⁵

The system, nicknamed "Indocom," undoubtedly had military value by linking major army headquarters. This was intentional by the administration, since allowing only items without military value to an armed force had limited positive effects. Just as important, the civil network on which the army now relied were PKI-controlled. Hence, the system "would assist [the] Army in any showdown with PKI or in situation where called upon [to] protect American lives."¹⁷⁶

State Department chose commercial channels for the Indocom deliveries, even though it would mean severely reducing the gift value of the deliveries, could lead to some difficult new negotiations and certainly would delay the deliveries for some months.¹⁷⁷ The reason for the choice was State’s fear of public knowledge of their support to the army. A partial or full MAP involvement would require Congress knowledge, and at least informing the Congressional leaders. Press leaks were hence probable, and "Congressional and public opinion here would vigorously oppose completion of project even though neither 1965 or 1966 funds [are] required." ¹⁷⁸ Since the project "could not be kept secret" to the Congress, it "would produce [a] serious political problem and debate which would force publicity [...]" ¹⁷⁹ Any public knowledge would harm the Indonesian army, "Any rationale of justification for MAP completion Indocom that would have [a] chance of reconciling Congress to [the] project would involve public exposure of reasons which would be almost certainly damaging to Yani and [the] Indo[nesian] Army". ¹⁸⁰ Press writings could even "give Subandrio and PKI [the] ammunition they need to overthrow or hamstring Yani and anti-PKI army leadership," State and Defense department summarized. ¹⁸¹ The most prominent argument against any support to the military hence was also in practice that aid could hurt more than it helped. State quoted examples of incidents to underline the importance of the argument, for instance had Chaerul Saleh and his BPS-party been seriously damaged politically by a Time article claiming that he received US support, they recalled.

At the end of July, it became impossible to keep the Indocom negotiations wholly away from Congressional and public knowledge. However, disguised as a commercial and insignificant deal, there was relatively few protests and press mentions of the negotiations when State informally briefed the subcommittees. Only Wall Street Journal informed that "some Congressmen [voiced] horror"¹⁸² at the deal and that the Congress accepted only with "some expression [of] uneasiness" ¹⁸³ State’s decision to grant export license, should negotiations for Indocom succeed. The involved Congressmen most likely guessed or was informally hinted of the arguments which State and Defense did not want to tell them openly. ¹⁸⁴

The British were informed of the negotiations by State, and along with the Malaysians, London expressed their dislike.¹⁸⁵ Although the UK were "primarily concerned with [the] ability [to] stop flood of sales by other NATO members and Japan [...]," "[...] such a transaction would increase difficulty HMG defend continuing support to US policy [in] Vietnam," ¹⁸⁶ implying the Indocom supply could hurt British support in Vietnam. Washington assured London and Kuala Lumpur, and later Canberra and Wellington, that the radio system would have no military effect on Konfrontasi. Indocom could neither be used to jam other transmissions or to send propaganda broadcasts, State announced to counter Malaysian and British fears. To make the claims creditable, State let independent technicians release their evaluation into the public, hiding State’s hand behind the releases. ¹⁸⁷ However, State’s dilemma remained: They could not openly pronounce their reasons to the British, and certainly not to the Malaysians. Still, London and Kuala Lumpur should be able to work out the US considerations themselves, State thought, since speculations had of US support to the Indonesian army against the PKI had regularly occurred in the public. ¹⁸⁸

In the end of August, what Ambassador Green’s previous had warned proved right: General Yani and the Indonesian army did not find only three communication sites to be worth the cost and risks, and on September 3, the army officially informed the Philco representative that Indonesia was not interested in a contract for three sites only. Hence, the negotiations ended unsuccessfully, albeit in "a completely friendly atmosphere."¹⁸⁹ The reasons, Washington assumed was probably that the army "may have felt it not expedient" in the "present anti-American atmosphere" ¹⁹⁰ to receive American support, besides the inhibitions from having a three-site only system. ¹⁹¹

Ambassador Green expressed some relief at the breakdown, commenting, "we seem [to] be coming out of [a] difficult situation very well," but was wary about negative effects from public knowledge: It " would be most regrettable [to] spoil thing now by having Brits, Malaysians or others crow to loudly," he warned.¹⁹² Green’s relief, despite the original American wish to supply the system may have stemmed from several causes: The negotiations had provided the opportunity to maintain contact with the army and prove some friendship, while the unsuccessful results pre-empted the possible protests and damages in following an actual delivery of the radio system, which could have had negative effects on both the Indonesian army leadership and the administration’s relations to Congress, London and Kuala Lumpur. A temporary communication system had been set up with Philco help during the negotiations, providing some of the army’s urgent need for an alternative to the PKI-controlled system, and the US offered to supply spare parts for the temporary system also after the MAP agreement on the system finally ended on September 30, providing political changes did not inhibit it. ¹⁹³

State decided to keep the Indocom cancellation secret until all involved personnel had left Indonesia in the end of September, only informing London, Canberra and Wellington while excluding Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.¹⁹⁴ This secrecy may have been the source of the widespread later belief that the system indeed was delivered. It is fairly certain that neither the Philco system nor parts for it were delivered in 1965, nor before or after October 1—it was both technically impossible to rig i This secrecy may have been the source of the widespread later belief that the system indeed was delivered. It is fairly certain that neither the Philco system nor parts for it were delivered in 1965, nor before or after October 1—it was both technically impossible to rig it at such short notice, and it was against the political tendency in Washington as well as tactical concerns both in Washington and in the Indonesian army. However, a rudimentary and temporary internal army system had been put up with US help. Moreover, there may or may not have been semi-official deliveries of other kind of smaller, communication devices, although the same tactical arguments against such deliveries apply for all military support to the army, and even more so in the tense days after October 1. ¹⁹⁵ The dangers inherit in discovery of such help made delivireis unattractive both to the army and to the US. What CIA officers, US Air Force officers, individual MILTAG officers or Lockheed and Philco representatives in Djakarta and Singapore may have pursued of private policies and made of private deliveries is a matter beyond the scope of this treatment, although there are evidence suggesting that a few such initiatives took place . It is however not likely that such deliveries had any significant size, nor altered US policy, nor influenced the outcome of events in any significant manner.

The administration’s actual handling of military deliveries to Indonesia was in line with its internally stated policies, and State Department carefully filtered and phased out commercial and official deliveries, under constant pressure from London and Congress. Correspondingly, the Indonesian army hesitated and finally rejected US support due to the liabilities it posed in the strongly anti-American climate in Indonesia. The most significant single US contribution that may have altered the course of events in Djakarta was the temporary and secret communication system that made the army independent of PKI-controlled civilian communications, besides the long term effect of the previous policy of exposing the army and Mobrig to Western training and values and forging personal friendships. The prominent feature of US relations to the Indonesian army by 1965, was that it was on the wane, reluctantly the two partners were forced apart.

Conclusion

By September 1965, the climate for US support to the Indonesian anti-Communists had been rendered very difficult. The US continued its policy of upholding a contact network with the Indonesian army and other anti-Communists throughout 1964 and 1965. The administration furthermore continually sought to forward aid for this exact purpose, including a few items of actual military value. What has been interpreted as a change of US policy into a harder line, actually was an adaptation of the existing policy. This adaptation was intended to answer the continued pressure that the PKI and others exerted on US presence in Indonesia. The intention of US low posture and the seemingly harder line was to uphold US presence by removing its weak spots. However the US did not succeed, and was gradually forced to relinquish its contacts, until only the informal and unofficial contact network remained by the end of September 1965.

    From summer 1964 to September 1965, two major revisions of US policy     towards Indonesia occurred. Both were responses to events in Indonesia. The first US major revision started when Sukarno escalated Konfrontasi in August and September 1964. The escalation made US direct involvement on British side in Konfrontasi more likely, and combined with the new strength of Sukarno’s anti-American rhetoric, this made further official military aid to Indonesia political impossible. The US, who already last year had cancelled its arms deliveries, now also cancelled its MAP and training programs. However, the administrations sought to protract the cancellation process, in order to maintain its contact functions for as long as possible. Hence, the phase out of American aid was a slow process, and the final MAP program, although formally cancelled one year earlier, actually ended in September 1965. The US after Septmeber 1965 also partly adopted the British view that Konfrontasi was a part of a broad and diffuse campaign against the West, and not something which could be negotiated to a solution, and the US did not make any further major attempts to halt Konfrontasi. However, the US revision only ended as an adjustment of US policy, while its main course of upholding contact with the Indonesian army continued.

The broad PKI-led campaign against US official and private installations in Djakarta forced forward the second US revision in March and April 1965. The US oil installations in Indonesia was then under the immediate danger of expropriation. The weakening position of Jones versus the administration and the Djakarta embassy added the situation’s gravity. A campaign by George Ball made the President authorize a broad review of US policy in Indonesia, and Ellsworth Bunker was sent on a mission to Indonesia to evaluate the US policy and if possible, offset the immediate threats to the US installations. Bunker concluded once more that the existing US policy should continue. However, to avoid the PKI attacks which threatened to disrupt US contact with Indonesia, the most vulnerable US installations should be removed, and the embassy should downscale its activity so only the vital functions of contact and reporting remained. Hence, the US assumed a low posture to retain its defensive strategy. The Bunker mission led to a final US effort to forward new military aid to Indonesia, although tacitly and through commercial channels. Also, a new ambassador fit to the new situation was appointed, but without any significant political consequences, and the appointment did not reflect a change in US basic policy.

One of the defining aspects of US policy towards Indonesia in the period was its subordination to Vietnam inside the administration. The administration of Indonesia-policy was delegated downwards both in the State Department and the White House. This both partly led to, and partly was a consequence of that the administration continued its existing polices. It is significant that US Indonesian policy only reached presidential level when the two major crisis made those in daily charge of Indonesia policy mount up campaigns to make the President re-evaluate the American Indonesia policy.

Vietnam also played a role when the US decided to demonstrate military power towards Indonesia. The US repeatedly sent individual warships through Indonesian waters in 1964 and 1965. The triggering cause for these mare nostrum transits were Indonesian threats to limit and control international traffic through its waters, particularly targeted at British and American navy movements. The US involvement in Vietnam and the Indo-Pakistani war made free transits an immediate concern, besides being of basic strategic importance for the US. Hence, the US decided to make precedence by scheduling regular transits regularly without notifying Djakarta. There is little evidence suggesting that the US demonstration of power had any further direct connection with. However, the thought existed at least at a speculative level in the administration that American firm action in Vietnam could strengthen the resolve of the Indonesian army in the expected showdown with the PKI.

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