III. Summer 1963–Summer 1964: Competing Worldviews

From summer 1963 and onwards, interpretations of the Indonesian worldview became the determining factor in how US policy was shaped.² In Indonesia, Sukarno and PKI built a new set of ideologies, which the US had to face, both on an ideological level and in practical policy. Among the political manifestations of ideology, sport and alternative international organizations caused US concern. A general US cultural exchange program were consciously wrought in Indonesia. Different internal interpretations of Indonesia and its policies complicated the administrations work, as well as the US relationship with the army, but it did not by itself significantly alter the policy sought by the administration. However, the administration’s reluctance to settle for one single explanation, led them into conflict with the press, the Congress, the British and others, who all held clear interpretations with different policy implications than those of the administration—despite their shared objectives. The Malaysia-issue became the major issue where these differences in interpretation eventually led to the breakdown of the US strategy laid out in the action plan. When Kennedy died, the administration was left in a position where few policy options remained, besides upholding what was left of the defensive plan of keeping a foothold in Indonesia.

Which World

As the new and more challenging ideologies of Sukarno increasingly dominated Indonesian public life and policies, the US administration steadily evaluated the ideologies and their political implications. Sukarno’s foreign policy grew increasingly incomprehensible and irrational to Washington, and a number of different approaches were tried to explain the policies, ideology being one. An area which received special attention and extra funding was sport, where the Soviets and American indulged in a minor aid competition. Also, Indonesian participation in the 1964 Olympics became a symbolic decision for Indonesia’s role in the world society, as well as a test-bed for the importance of Sukarno’s ideologies to his foreign policy. The basic US policy towards any competing worldview consisted to a large part of cultural penetrations programs, normally under US Information Agency auspices.. In Indonesia, a prioritized cultural program was targeted against communism and Sukarno’s new ideologies. The basic tools were conscious, state-sponsored cultural dissemination and to "expose" the perceived post-Sukarno elite of Indonesia to American culture. The US objective was to secure the targets’ basic Western outlook, and hence political sympathies.

When dealing with Djakarta, American officials did not only face the cultural differences they were expecting and had prepared for. Increasingly they also had to relate to a range of new concepts and ideologies produced by the Indonesian Government, by different political movements and especially by Sukarno. The two central concepts that emerged were those surrounding "Guided Democracy" and "Nefo/Oldefo". The first was mostly related to internal politics and served as an extension to the national Pantjasila-ideology of 1945. The second concept, that of Nefo/Oldefo, defined Indonesia’s role in the world, and therefore became central in Indonesian foreign relations.

To the US, Sukarno’s conceptual families led to several considerations. First of all, the US officials had to take a stand regarding the validity of the ideological concepts themselves, or at least how to interpret them in relation to their own political worldview. Then, the US had to face the active use of the ideological terms, which gradually saturated the political and diplomatic language until both Indonesian press and the official and personal interchanges with Indonesian officials were completely permeated by the new language. Thirdly, and most importantly, there was the concrete political actions which Indonesians and others performed in the name of the ideologies: In this regard, Nefo/Oldefo and its siblings were ideologies with very visible consequences to US interests in Indonesia, whether the consequences stemmed from cold-blooded exploitation of the concepts or the ideologies’ inherent ability to initiate influential political actions.

    "Guided Democracy" as an ideological concept constituted in US categorization some form of description of, as well as rationale for, the political system that succeeded parliamentary democracy after 1958–60, when Sukarno assumed extensive presidential powers. Among the central concepts within Guided Democracy were those of unity and decisions made through collective deliberations (musjawarah) leading to consensus (mufakat), and finally expressed through Sukarno.³ This "Indonesian democracy" was defined in opposition to the Western-style competitive democracy, where open confrontation rather than consensus forged decisions.

The twin-concepts of Nefo/Oldefo were acronyms, like most of the political contagious memes⁴ which spread in Djakarta in the early sixties. The acronyms expanded to "New Emerging Forces/Old Established Forces". The idea was that the basic dichotomy in world politics lay between these two forces. The old established forces were the imperialistic, old powers; doomed to decline and morally inferior to the new, emerging forces. The new forces were the rising third world countries, led by Indonesia.

Initially the dichotomy was claimed to be an alternative to both the American/West-European "East-West" dichotomy and the Marxist "North-South" or "Imperialist-Colony/Center-Periphery" dichotomies. The concept should capture the political agenda of the Bandung-conference as well as the spirit of the neutral movement and turn them into an independent ideology. Accordingly, the non-aligned countries were initially defined as the core Nefo-countries, while the West-European countries were the core Oldefo-countries. Some countries, like Japan, consistently defied categorization. Other countries, like the United States and the Soviet Union were not consistently categorized into either category throughout the period in which the Nefo/Oldefo concept were used. Rather, their stature developed in tact with the political climate, events and as the initially vague concepts crystallized into more elaborate theory. Particularly from 1963 and onwards, the Nefo definitions changed from keeping some common ground with the non-aligned movement to becoming an alternative. Sukarno then defined countries like India and the United Arab Republic as being hostile, while China became a Nefo-country.

An extensive range of concepts were connected to Nefo/Oldefo and Guided Democracy. Some of the more important for the US became the concepts of Nekolim, Manipol-USDEK and Nasakom. Nekolim was an acronym for "neo-colonialism, colonialism, imperialism" , and soon developed into being an expanded variant over Oldefo which defined the enemies of the Nefos. This was the category in which the United States from late 1963 and early 1964 was firmly defined as the leading neo-colonialist nation. Manipol-USDEK, a more complex acronym, symbolized, in US perception more or less the direction, of Guided Democracy: A national unity consisting of the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian socialism, guided democracy, guided economy and Indonesian identity.⁵ Somehow, Manipol-USDEK also intertwined with and redefined the Indonesian national ideology since 1945: Pantjasila. To the US, Manipol-USDEK represented the political development they tried to forestall, while Pantjasila was deemed as a positive ideology. Nasakom was the political manifestation of Manipol-USDEK, not yet implemented. ⁶ To the US, Nasakomization was the ever impending threat, since the implementation of Nasakom would imply PKI participation in the Indonesian government. Nasakom was also a rhetorical weapon for the PKI, since it legitimized Communism as a basic stream among the people of Indonesia. Hence, the PKI could argue that those not accepting Nasakom rejected the Indonesian culture as well.

To Washington, the new concepts from Djakarta seldom made sense. They seemed to be simplistic, incoherent, illogical and purely emotionally appealing. Sukarno had "created a political philosophy and political slogans which appeal to a deep synoretic [sic] tendency in Indonesian culture and which [...] provide an all-encompassing umbrella under which he can operate to unite the most diverse political factions." Robert H. Johnson wrote in March 1961, "’Pantshila [sic] and more recently, ‘Usdek’, both quote devoid of genuine content, are expressions of this syncretism."⁷ To the administration, the characteristics syncretic and simplistic were both negative, and both were recurring phrases used when discussing Sukarno’s concepts. Furthermore, the newer Nefo and Nekolim concepts were directly hostile: They seemed to construct Indonesia as the center of the world, Sukarno’s as its godlike leader, and United States as the leader of its enemies. The "insidious anti-American, Nefo ideology," ⁸ however much it claimed to be a third way in the world, also increasingly resembled Beijing’s worldview after 1963—and more than could be purely coincidental, the administration assessed.

In State Department and the White House they concluded that the ideologies were nothing more than a guise for the power politics of Sukarno and the PKI. Their inconsistency stemmed from Sukarno’s need to remake ideology each time a major or minor event or shift in policy required foundation. Furthermore, Sukarno was fed with concepts from the communists—directly from the PKI and hence, indirectly from Beijing. The spreading of Nefo-ideology was a "an unholy pursuit," creating a "menace for us" and a "Trojan horse for [the] Chicoms," Ambassador Green commented in August 1965.⁹

However invalid and scorned within the administration, the concepts had to be faced when dealing with Indonesians. The US approach was in general to accommodate the Indonesians and talk within the conceptual framework when directly confronted with it. When not directly confronted, they tried to avoid using phrases within Sukarno’s ideological complexes as far as possible, except when they could be led back to a more Westernized conceptual network. Typically, when confronted with revolution by an Indonesian official, the American counterpart would bring up the revolutionary history of the United States; when talking about colonial conflict the American would talk of George Washington, when talking about independence, the American would talk of independence from Moscow and Beijing. Moreover, the US tried to argue with the more likable Pantjasila ideology against the more hostile ideologies. "We know that Indonesia can be a forceful influence for the principles of ‘Pantjasila’, with which we agree," Acting Secretary Ball instructed Jones to tell Sukarno in October 1963, "Can Sukarno reconcile his current policy and actions [i.e. Konfrontasi] with the principles of ‘Pantjasila’?"¹⁰

The most imminent concern for the US when confronted with Sukarno’s ideologies, was what political effect they might have. The British and Malayans thought the concepts were logical parts of a "Grand Design" by Sukarno for controlling the whole ethnic Malay area: Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaya and the British, Portuguese and Australian colonies.¹¹ Hence they often seemed to treat the rising conflict over Malaysia as intertwined with the hostile turn of Sukarno’s ideologies, almost dialectically connected. The Djakarta-centered worldview justified Indonesian expansionism, while Western hostility in return proved the ideology. The British also conveyed this interpretation to the Americans.

Variations of the Grand Design view of ideology received some support in the US, notably by Guy Pauker, in the press and among some Congressmen. Yet, most adherents to Grand Design-theories generally treated ideology as a rationalization or justification of policy, rather than a cause for policy. Causes for policy rather tended to be described in terms of power, self-interest or pride. Likewise, most of the administration were alarmed by Sukarno’s rhetoric, but few inside the administration actually uttered belief that the strong words were part of a conscious plan which would result into according action. During the debates on the causes of Indonesia’s aggression against Malaysia from 1963, ideology as well as religion entered the debate, but the policy makers in Washington were never fully convinced of the significance of neither.¹²

Sport was one of the few international fields where the ideology and religion seemed to influence political action most. In August 1962, Indonesia had hosted the Asian Games. During these games, Indonesia had after much faltering finally denied Israel participation—probably due to the combined Arab and Chinese pressure, the US estimated. The Asian Games had also to a large part been sponsored by the Soviet Union and the US, particularly through Soviet funding of the grandiose, new Asian Games-stadium in Djakarta and the American funding of the new "Djakarta by-pass," a new main approach into Djakarta.¹³

    The Indonesian obstruction of Israeli participation in the games had consequences. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Tokyo hesitated to allow the Indonesians to participate in the 1964 Summer Olympics in Tokyo. To the Americans this was more disturbing than a first glance suggests. Already in 1961, Democratic Senator Hubert Humphrey and Robert Kennedy—both now active in Indonesian policy—had discussed using sports in general and the Olympics in particular as political tools. Hubert Humphrey called publicly for a campaign to counter the obvious Russian commitment to use the Olympics for political purposes. In particular, the Olympics had a psychological impact, by demonstrating the superiority of one’s own society. Sport held an important place in the public psyche, and hence was important both for PR and internal moral.

    In Indonesia, the Cold War of sports was reflected in a localized, but widely publicized sport race. The Asian Games contributions were one result. Moreover, the Peace Corps in Indonesia concentrated its activities on sports, and most of its volunteers in Indonesia were coaches, primarily athletes. Their operations had, from the US point of view, considerable success as public goodwill-projects. As a counter-move, the Soviets sent in high-profile athlete coaches on a competing program, among them a former Olympic champion from Czechoslovakia . Despite the embassy’s and other American legation’s detailed and continued surveillance of the Bloc coaches, the two teams touring Indonesia collided at one time: The teams got into a confrontation over the use of a track field, hence causing reports to the United States over the symbolic Cold War confrontation in a remote town in Indonesia. When Robert Kennedy visited Indonesia in 1962, he also made special arrangements for building ties with Indonesians sport associations.

    Indonesian participation in the Olympics became a symbolic decision for the Indonesians, and held in US eyes enough public relations value to spend time on securing. The issue was heightened in priority when Sukarno in February 1963 announced that he wanted to host alternative Nefo games instead of the Olympic games and Asian Games, since Indonesia was not welcome in the "imperialist" Tokyo games. The alternative games were dubbed the Games of Nefo (Ganefo) , and only Nefo countries were invited to the games, planned to take place in November 1963.

Ganefo fell neatly into a line of alternative events hosted or planned by Sukarno in the name of Nefo: There were alternative African-Asian youth conferences, worker’s conferences, writer’s and artists conferences and more. The conferences were not only alternatives to worldwide or UN-sponsored conferences, but to the Moscow-sponsored or Western-dominated counterparts—and notably to the activities of the non-aligned or neutral movement. The alternative arrangements, combined with Nefo-rhetoric, signified to the US that Indonesia after the Belgrade conference had left the neutralist stance of "mediating" between the blocks and seeking peace. The Nefo/Oldefo stance was seen to be opposed to Tito, Jawaharlal Nehru and Gamal Abdel Nasser’s neutralism: The Marxist inspiration was obvious and rather than promoting peace between the superpowers, it portrayed an inevitable conflict between the Nefos and Oldefos.

Washington concluded that the increased Nefo-related activities in Djakarta most of all reflected Djakarta’s turn towards Beijing and increased PKI influence over Sukarno. Beijing funded some of the Nefo arrangements, and notably the monumental new Nefo Conference center—the center’s "obviously" oversized facilities for Nefo-purposes made the US suspicious of what use it actually was meant to have. The "isolation" from the Oldefo institutions inherited in the Nefo stance seemingly suited Beijing well, and Beijing indeed became a core member of the Nefo community, along with other internationally isolated nations like North-Korea, Albania and Cambodia.

Although the US sounded out IOC and Tokyo on Indonesian participation in the 1964 Olympics, it soon became evident that the pressure had to be put on the Indonesian side. Djakarta had to accept the terms of participation, and by that symbolize their continued presence as a respectable member of the international society. The US pressure was mostly performed by urging different ministers and Sukarno through letters and conversations. The effort was by no means comparable to the amount of effort put into the major foreign policy questions like West Irian and petroleum, but still an issue of some significance.

The intermediate American objective was to persuade Sukarno from arranging Ganefo. The persuasions fell short, and the games were held on the very stadium which Soviet and the US had contributed to, and hence symbolized defeat to both Moscow and Washington. Ganefo were "perhaps the most subtle but clear expression" of the "Sino-Indonesian rapprochement of 1963" Guy Pauker subsequently concluded.¹⁴ In spring 1964, before the 1964 Olympics, a new wave of US diplomatic activity emerged. The IOC now accepted Indonesian participation, on the term that no athlete that had participated in Ganefo could participate in Tokyo. Despite the urgings of the US and others, the Indonesian government refused to accept the condition, making their final decision only days before the Olympics were about to start. Thus Indonesia had broken a symbolical tie to international organizations in favor of their own Nefo-variant.

During 1965, Indonesia also tried to spread their ideology through ideological and military training of groups from Laos, Burma, Cambodia, Pakistan, North Korea and North Vietnam. The training had little military significance, but still disturbed the US.¹⁵

To pre-empt and counter competing ideologies, the US pursued to strengthen the American worldview inside Indonesia. The US Information Agency/Service (USIA/USIS) had been active in Indonesia since Eisenhower.¹⁶ They ran libraries, held language courses, distributed Hollywood pictures, TV-shows and news items, as well as funneled direct monetary support to the local press. Alongside the CIA, USIA also monitored the Indonesian media, and reported on the "psy-war"-activities of the PKI propaganda apparatus. ¹⁷

USIA budgets and plans ran simultaneously with the similar Action Plan programs. However, the USIA programs often were separated in budgeting and planning from the other programs, due to USIA’s focus on area wide activities and status as a separate agency with full diplomatic status for its officials.¹⁸ Under Secretary Rusk, USIA was reformed, upgraded and integrated into an intrinsic, but independent part of the diplomatic system. On the NSC meetings, the USIA director was a natural participant.

Southeast Asia and Indonesia were priority areas in the escalating programs of USIA: Of the direct cost of USIS missions, East Asian and Pacific missions used around 17% of the expenditures at the time. The $9 million p.a. mostly covered salaries, and excluded centralized production costs, media services and other administration costs, which constituted the larger part of the $130 million p.a. total USIS expenditures.¹⁹ The $780.000 actual allocation for Indonesia in 1963 constituted the single largest USIA effort in East Asia, next to Japan’s $1.440.000 and barely overspending Vietnam’s $760.000. ²⁰

The main target for what the administration internally first called "indoctrination" and later "psy-war" efforts, were "the next generation," the young and those aspiring to leadership in the post-Sukarno era. It was the "communicators, government and political leaders, professional people [...] plus [...] the youth, the students, and the labor groups from whose numbers the future leaders will emerge."²¹ The students were important, since they were in a formative stage, and hence the ones most easily lured into embracing communism, besides being "the main centers of unrest." ²²

Specifically for Indonesia, the USIS missions focussed on contacts with higher ranking army officers, particularly outside Djakarta and on the other islands. USIA to some extent aided the civic action program. Besides the general program of "exposure" to Western media, USIA participated in training programs, tended personal contacts, hosted social gatherings and held language courses targeted at military officers. The USIA’s general objectives in the area coincided with the Action Plan programs’ for similar aid, like education and exchange of civilian and military students. The USIA programs were however more outspoken in their culture exporting objectives. In all their efforts, the Americans had the strongest faith in the positive effects of exposure to American lifestyle and values.

The USIA operated with a worldwide instruction concentrating on a few central themes. The first list was issued by Agency Director Edward R. Murrow in July 1961, and proscribed five long term themes, all concentrating on foreign policy: The nuclear test ban treaty—"the first vital step toward general disarmament.," West Berlin, the United nations, US preference for a system based on free choice – opposed to the Communist coercive system, and finally the US conviction that modernization could "best be achieved though democratic, pragmatic means." In 1963, these themes changed. The nuclear test ban were replaced by the general pursuit of peace and "actions leading to general and complete disarmament." The second priority item was now the US determination to maintain necessary strength in order "to protect its own freedom," and aid "other free nations against threats to their independence," to be able to keep its commitments and to be reliable "in the time of need," generalizing Berlin-support into the whole world of allies. New on the list, was the US commitment to the rule of law, to "freedom of the individual, of the community, and of the nation under law[...]"

In April, 1964, the new director of USIA, Carl T. Rowan, issued a new list, which supplemented the previous with a new emphasis on American lifestyle and society. This list was even more directly targeted against the neutral and third world countries. Its first priority was the racial and ethnic progress of minorities in the US. Here the Civil Rights efforts was to be used as a positive propaganda tool, partly to counter the communist usage of the racial riots as a sign of sickness in the American society. Secondly, the economic strength of the US should be emphasized, and this strength’s consequences for military strength and ability to forward "substantial aid to less developed countries." Thirdly, "economic democracy" was an important facet—"the American system of ‘capitalism with a conscience’," with "widespread ‘social benefits, strong labor unions, a progressive tax system, broad capable ownership by the populace, and Government regulatory agencies’." In the fourth and fifth place on the list of worldwide priority themes, "scientific and educational strength" was followed by "cultural development."

The are several interesting aspects to the priority themes mentioned above. One is how they start up being dominated by concrete, somewhat European-centered and event-based issues in 1961, like West-Berlin and the test ban treaty. Then they evolve into more general, principled themes in 1963, before they in 1964 are complemented by a list of positive images of the US society in general. The same few themes furthermore try to communicate to a very diverse, worldwide audience. They use terms close to those of the political left wing or the third world countries’ rhetoric, for instance in the focus on a strong labor movement. Many of the issues appeal to idealism and to notions of freedom, welfare and security. The societal themes from 1964 furthermore reflect Lyndon B Johnson’s priorities in internal politics, and use internal policy issues for an appealing description of the US abroad. The issues also appeal to strength. This in line with the common Washington impression that the language of strength was the only one understood in many third world countries, Indonesia included.²³ The United States was consciously portrayed as the probable victor in the Cold War.

In addition to the long-term priority issues, special ad-hoc worldwide priority themes were sent out, and there were local themes.²⁴ Among the worldwide ad-hoc themes during the early sixties were the transition of presidency in 1963, and how the transition represented no shift in policy or threat to stability. In 1964, the Vietnam war became a special ad-hoc theme, alongside the Ranger 7 photographs of the moon and the presidential elections in November. In 1965, the special themes were Johnson’s inauguration, the Civil Rights developments, further space exploration events, The Dominican republic, Vietnam and the implementation of Johnson’s Great Society program. ²⁵

In Indonesia, Sukarno was reportedly thrilled by the pictures of the moon and Mars which he received from USIS. The racial issue dealt more directly with a problem: The racial riots in the US was much publicized in Indonesia, and rarely in a favorable light for the US. The race issue was taken up by Sukarno and others on numerous occasions when talking to American officials from Jones to Robert Kennedy. Single events, like Mohammad Ali’s (then Cassius Clay) victory over Sonny Liston in 1964 and subsequent black pride statements and conversion was a neighboring topic which received considerable attention in Indonesia, as was events concerning Malcolm X and the Black Moslems movement. Both were issues which the Americans in turn tried to spin into a positive angle as signs of progress in the US on racial issues. The Civil Rights-stand of Kennedy and Johnson became important to secure particularly Kennedy’s public stature in Indonesia, as well as to safeguard Sukarno’s sympathy for Kennedy and acknowledge that the US had positive sides beyond its current imperialist outlook. On the other side, the prospect of a Republican victory in the 1964 elections were a considerable threat to US public relations effort, and in the eyes of the administration, no conservatives would be able to improve the US image abroad by publicity trips and good-will visits.²⁶

From 1953 and onwards, the US were confronted with a range of new and more hostile ideological concepts and rhetoric from Sukarno. The US disregarded the concepts as simplistic and rationalization of policy, but still tried to turn them into their advantage when possible. Sport was an area where ideology as well as public relation received attention and considerable funding from both Washington and Moscow. A decision of strong symbolic value to the US was made when Indonesia, despite US efforts, chose to hold their own alternative Olympics, arranged under their own Nefo-ideology, instead of the Tokyo Olympics. The political pole of DjakarFrom 1953 and onwards, the US were confronted with a range of new and more hostile ideological concepts and rhetoric from Sukarno. The US disregarded the concepts as simplistic and rationalization of policy, but still tried to turn them into their advantage when possible. Sport was an area where ideology as well as public relation received attention and considerable funding from both Washington and Moscow. A decision of strong symbolic value to the US was made when Indonesia, despite US efforts, chose to hold their own alternative Olympics, arranged under their own Nefo-ideology, instead of the Tokyo Olympics. The political pole of Djakarta now seemed to be Beijing. The US tried to forward their own worldview in Indonesia mostly through the second largest USIA effort in East Asia, and largely through programs for cultural diffusion. Also, domestic US events and policy were important to prove the US’ credibility among in Djakarta. In the terms of Manipol-USDEK: While most of leftist Djakarta could accept that the US in its roots was a revolutionary nation, the US was now betraying its nature. The USIA and other American officials in Indonesia tried to tell that the roots had not rotted: They were now what gave life to the mighty American tree. However, the ideologies of Sukarno until 1963 seemed to pose no immediate threats, and no larger political confrontations had emerged from clashing ideologies or propaganda.

Konfrontasi

The first major issue to be dominated by the problems of interpretation were the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. The various interpretations of the reasons behind the conflict implied directly opposing policies. The US sought many explanations, without settling for a single. Rather, complexity itself became the preferred reason in the administration. However, the British and other states held firm views, which led to policies that undermined the existing US policy towards Sukarno. For the US, this led to a conflict of interest, since the US at this time prioritized their other Indonesia policies higher than Malaysia issue. The following uncoordinated US and British actions on Malaysia hence was perceived as an obstacle to the US.

In May 1961, Britain and Malaya had proposed a Malaysian federation. Malaya had then been independent from Britain since 1957, but remained under British military responsibility. The new Malaysian federation would besides Malaya include Singapore, the Crown Colonies of Sabah and Sarawak in British Borneo, and finally the small British protectorate Brunei, a semi-independent autocratic sultanate which was wedged in between Sabah and Sarawak. Such a federation would keep the fragile majority of ethnic Malays in power by balancing the largely Chinese Singapore against the different ethnicities of Borneo. Given the firm anti-communism of the Malay majority, the new Malaysian state was also seen by the British and Americans as a safeguard against communist sympathy among the ethnic Chinese in the area, particularly in Singapore.

The relative calmness of Indonesian foreign policy after West Irian did not last long. On February 13, 1963 Sukarno formally declared a policy of confrontation (Konfrontasi) against the formation of Malaysian federation. The scenario in many ways seemed familiar to West Irian: It was a dispute around de-colonization of territories bordering Indonesia, now even on the same land mass and with a partly Malay population. Once again, Djakarta streets were filled with nationalistic rallies arranged by the PKI, and once more Sukarno excelled in anti-colonial rhetoric, with full army backing. As with the West Irian issue, the Americans first saw the Soviet hand behind Indonesian aggression.

There were also easily seen differences from the West Irian dispute: This time, the European colonial power involved was Great Britain, and thus the conception of Indonesia as the natural heir of the Dutch East Indies did not apply. The conflict also involved other independent nations in the area, namely Malaya and the Philippines. Furthermore, the disputed areas were not remote wasteland, but densely populated or oil-rich areas like Malaya and Brunei. The disputed areas were strategically more central than West Irian: They formed the southern crescent of the South China Sea as well as the northeast side of the densely trafficked straits of Malacca. Singapore was at the heart of the conflict, both geographically and by being a both a trade center and the home of a central British military base.

It took Kennedy only a day to denounce Sukarno’s confrontation and publicly announce his support to Malaysia and Great Britain. There was one prime reason behind the American support of Malaysia: That the US shared the British strategic plans for the federation of Malaysia. From the British and American view, a Malaysian federation had three important advantages: It would save an ailing Singaporean economy, which suffered from poor access to the Malayan hinterland. It would further integrate the politically unstable Singapore into a non-Chinese, non-communist state. Most importantly, the new federated state would serve as a buffer against the northern threat from China and the communists, as well as strengthen the safeguard against any possible future Indonesian expansionism. It would also help secure the Malacca straits and South China Sea for trade and naval movements between the Indian and Pacific oceans. In the administration, there was no significant dissent to the support for Malaysia, and little debate on this issue. The US position had remained unchanged since the plans were first discussed in 1961.

Another aiding factor for US going against Konfrontasi so strongly, was that the formation of Malaysia were guided by the British. In Southeast Asia, the "special relationship" between USA and Britain remained in many aspects, particularly regarding national security issues.²⁷ The British base in Singapore was widely used by the Americans, and had been actively used by CIA in the 1958 to support the regional rebellion in Indonesia. The two countries cooperated closely on military and security issues. In US eyes, the Anzus treaty indirectly bound the United States to support the British against hostilities in the area, due to Anzus partner Australia’s Commonwealth treaties with the UK and Malaysia. ²⁸ The British had furthermore sided with the US against the Dutch on the West Irian issue, and had done so with little hesitation. A practical sharing of the work load also took place: While Indonesian security issues, like a minor military aggression, was mainly considered American responsibility, Malaya and Singapore were British responsibilities. ²⁹ The special relationship did however not take place without differences, and diverging agendas occurred. Still, there was a high barrier for going openly against the British, and especially in issues concerning regional security. ³⁰

For the US, Sukarno’s signs of hostility against a future Malaysia had until now been only a minor irritation, and did not significantly influence the relations between Indonesia and the US. The Malaysian question was a British concern, where the US chose to remain in passive support. As the actions of Indonesia and the Philippines increased the tension, the Malaysia issue turned into one of direct American concern.

At first, Indonesia had expressed no objections to the proposed Malaysian federation.³¹ Neither had Sukarno objected to the formation of an independent Malaya in 1957, despite that the Malay areas of the British colonies had been included in the broader Indonesian/Malayan nationalism. Sukarno was known to have supported this broad nationalism during the Indonesian war of independence. ³² The PKI, however, had opposed the Malaysia plans from the very beginning, branding them as neo-colonialism. The Djakarta press had followed the PKI cue and soon turned hostile to the federation plans.

The Philippine government under president Diosdado Macapagal also protested the Malaysia plans, and raised an old claim on Sabah. Yet the Philippines stated that they had no objections to a Malaysian federation per se, only to the inclusion of Sabah.³³ On July 27, 1962 President Macapagal had proposed an alternative plan for a greater Malayan confederation, consisting of all the involved Colonies in Borneo as well as Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaya. The still vague concept of a loose Pan-Malay confederation was later named Maphilindo.

Malaya under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman (the Tunku), Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew and Britain had continued to prepare for the federation throughout 1961, with US approval. In the first half of 1962, popular hearings and elections were held in the different territories, all establishing popular majority in favor of a Malaysian federation. Only among the 78.000 inhabitants of Brunei, doubts emerged over participation in the federation.

In Indonesia, the mood toward the Malaysian federation chilled during 1962. In September, Foreign Minister Subandrio announced that Indonesia had a security concern with Malaysia, and hence would not allow military bases in non-Indonesian Borneo, hinting that "an American base, for instance," would be countered with "a Soviet base on [their] part of Borneo".³⁴ Tunku Abdul Rahman reacted strongly, calling the statement a virtual "declaration of cold war," which Sukarno topped by saying that "physical conflict" with between Indonesia and Malay might well become "unavoidable". ³⁵

During fall, a small Bruneian guerilla force under the leadership of Sheik Azahari had been allowed to train in Indonesian Borneo. The training was well known to Western intelligence, although it was uncertain whether it was the regional army commander, known for his independence, or Djakarta who had authorized the training. Chairman Sheik Azahari and his anticommunist Brunei People’s Party had won 14 out of 15 constituencies in the recent elections held in Brunei. However, the elected representatives had no actual power, and the Sultan and his British protectors seemed reluctant to grant any. Azahari’s party was strongly opposed to a Malaysian federation, but preferred an independent, single North-Bornean state consisting of Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak, much like the British had first proposed in 1958.

In December 1962 a revolt broke out in Brunei, and Sheik Azahari declared the formation of the Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara (Northern Borneo) with himself as President. Azahari was still in Manila after talks with the Philippine Vice President when he declared the state, making Manila the de facto capital of the new state. Two days later, Sukarno proclaimed his support to an independent Bornean state under Azahari. The main thrust of the revolt was put down in a week by three British Ghurka battalions. However, the rebellion provided an opening for Sukarno to increase his criticism of the Malaysian federation.

On January 13, 1963 Sukarno declared confrontation, Konfrontasi, against Malaysia on a mass meeting in Djakarta. "We are being encircled," Sukarno spoke in English, "[...] We do not want to have neo-colonialism in our vicinity".³⁶ Sukarno used the PKI arguments and portrayed Malaysia as a neo-colonial plot designed only to contain Indonesia and keep British colonial power intact. That Malaysia’s defense and economy still was to be controlled from London, Sukarno presented as evidence of the colonialist nature of the proposed federation.

The launch of Konfrontasi made the Malaysia issue cross the line for how long the US could overlook its existence. It became an international issue which could escalate into an armed conflict. Hence, there was also a danger of US direct military involvement: A conflict would lead to Australian military support to the British Australia could then demand the US to fulfill its Anzus obligations, and the US could be forced to participate in a military conflict against Indonesia at the very time the US tried to build up and befriend the Indonesian army. The US initiatives to turn Indonesia westwards would have small chances of survival, should the US be involved in direct hostilities against Indonesia, likewise would the US friendly contact with the army be endangered.

The day after Sukarno’s speech, President Kennedy gave his open support to the Malaysian federation on a press conference, "because [Malaysia] is the best hope of security for that very vital part of the world."³⁷ The statement was directly targeted against Sukarno. Kennedy’s intention was to calm Sukarno down by making him realize the dangers involved in a confrontation, particularly the consequences it could have for Indonesian relations with the US. This was the first time Kennedy openly spoke against Sukarno in the Malaysia question, and it was not received well in Djakarta. Rather than calming down, Sukarno increased the temperature, and expressed offense and surprise at Kennedy’s statement.

To the Americans, Indonesian reasons for entering Konfrontasi were a puzzle. Hostility had first been expressed by PKI, and both Ambassador Jones, the White House and State Department presumed that Moscow and Beijing had been active behind the scenes.³⁸ The Bloc strategy was hence first assumed to be the same as under the West Irian crisis: To exploit Indonesian nationalism and to provoke conflict between Indonesia and Great Britain. The Malaysian conflict had the advantage for the Soviets of involving the United States, Australia and New Zealand by treaty. Hence the West Irian loophole was ruled out: The US could not side with Indonesia against the other Western interests in this conflict, as they had did in the West Irian conflict. The disadvantage to Moscow was interpreted to be that, unlike in West Irian, the Indonesians were not likely to be the victor of a full-scale war. Accordingly, the US assumed that Soviet and Chinese interest rather lay in a small-scale, protracted and lukewarm semi-war, designed to annoy and tire out British commitments in Southeast Asia. The first year of Konfrontasi, the fervent PKI support and reports of Soviet diplomatic efforts to encourage escalation were taken as evidence of Beijing’s and Moscow’s intentions.

The communists’ intentions were however not a crucial issue, as long as the power to control the confrontation was perceived to lie with Sukarno. In order to find a way to halt the conflict, the US tried to analyze the reasons Indonesia and the Philippines may have had to instigate it. For the Philippines, the reasons seemed simple enough: Economic gain combined with a colonial demand and a wish not to alienate Djakarta. For Sukarno, however, no single rational reason seemed sufficient.

Until spring 1963, the prime reason for Sukarno’s oral attacks against Malaysia were deemed to be his personal peculiarities. Ambassador Jones attributed the hostility mostly to the Indonesian president’s personality and emotions: He was a colonial hero and nation-builder, and pre-occupied with anti-colonialism wherever it took place – it was his very heartbeat.³⁹ Sukarno personally was willing to fight anywhere, anytime for people’s freedom, Jones argued. Jones was convinced that Sukarno actually believed that the British had duped the elections, that the Borneans wanted independence and that the British had mischievous intentions. Furthermore, Malaya had insulted and irritated Sukarno: They had performed much better economically after independence and had a more stable political system, but had gone through the de-colonization process in the opposite manner of Indonesia: The British had left peacefully, rather than been thrown out. Where Sukarno had ousted Dutch economic dominance, the British retained their in Malaya. Moreover, independent Malaya’s prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, seemed in manners and education more British than Asian. To the nationalists in Djakarta, the Malayan state represented treason and its leaders were fifth-columnists to the anti-colonial cause. When Malaya expanded into Borneo—practically natural Indonesian territory—Sukarno had every emotional reason to attack Malaysia, Jones concluded. Konfrontasi was hence a result of irrational emotions, and could not be stopped with rational arguments. State Department concurred more dryly that "Historical, social, economic, linguistic, cultural and psychological factors" all contributed to a continuing "high volatility in the relations of leaders of Indonesia and Malaya". ⁴⁰

A variation of the personality explanation attributed Sukarno’s behavior to the Javanese mystical conception of power. Sukarno supposedly felt a personal divine right and duty to exert his mystically given autocratic power over his area, and his area included the Northern Bornean territories. The Malaysian federation had upset this right, and it had upset the power system. Sukarno could see it as his mystical obligation as well as right to maintain the power structure which culminated in himself. Konfrontasi was necessary to keep the powers of chaos away. The basic assumption was that Javanese mystical power was a binary concept: Power was either total, or it was nothing. If Sukarno lost power by caving in to a Malaysian federation, he and the Javanese elite with him, might believe that he would lose Indonesia entirely. The alternative would be chaos. Furthermore, Sukarno’s actions could be interpreted in the light of the actions of his favorite character in the shadow plays: The righteous, idealistic warrior-king, who led his brothers in a devastating battle for justice against their own cousins. To explore the mystical aspects, Jones sough out Sukarno’s spiritual adviser (dukun) with his deputies and others, but without success.⁴¹ The mystical explanation was not sufficient neither to Jones or to the Americans, nor was it a prominent model. However, in different variations, the mystical explanation provided the element of Javanese mysticism which the administration tended to include as ad notams in their analyses of Indonesian affairs.

When Konfrontasi escalated beyond rhetoric during spring 1963, Washington, no longer were satisfied with emotional, personal or mystical explanations alone. Sukarno’s actions were now interpreted along the lines of the theory of Sukarno as a power politician. The West Irian confrontation had shown Sukarno the advantages of an external enemy. The lack of external threats made it more likely that the delicate balance act between the army and PKI would fall to Sukarno’s disadvantage: He would lose the power to set the army and PKI up against each other in a competition where Sukarno controlled the battlefield: Emotional nationalism. Sukarno’s popularity was his main strength, and that popularity rested on his ability to stir up popular, mostly nationalist, emotions.

Furthermore, an enemy could be part of a conscious nation-building effort. Sukarno, a nation-builder, would know this, and he would see Malaysia as a low-risk target. Also, Sukarno knew the army would support the concept, since an external enemy helped contain the internal army differences. Besides, it was difficult for the army to oppose a nationalist issue without endangering its popular credentials.⁴² The PKI, would naturally support any budding conflict with a Western power. Hence, it seemed to be internal political reasons and Sukarno’s balance act that lay behind Konfrontasi rather than actual foreign policy concerns.

Events altered the foundations of the US analysis. Preliminary negotiations had started in Manila on April 9, 1963. Representatives from Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines attended. The US privately voiced their support to both the Maphilindo concept and an "Asian solution". The US did not want to take part in the negotiations themselves. To underline their seriousness in opposing Malaysia, the Indonesians a few days into the negotiations launched their first military action in Borneo. Although of little military significance, it was an alarming move. So-called "refugees" and volunteers were trained by the Indonesian army, and then infiltrated as guerillas into the Bornean jungle, supposedly under the cover of being part of Azahari’s rebel forces. None of the involved parties doubted that Indonesia controlled the forces, although Indonesia denied any such control. On the borders, the guerillas faced British, Malayan and later Australian troops, and with considerable losses.⁴³ Also, with the increased military activity and indications of military action taken without Sukarno’s pre-approval, it now seemed more and more like the army actively drove the conflict further, rather than just following Sukarno’s lead. ⁴⁴

Some of the US-friendly leaders in the Indonesian army presented the embassy officials for an alternative reasoning behind the army support to Konfrontasi: They held that Malaysia actually represented a communist threat, contrary to what the British and Americans thought. To some army leaders, to form Malaysia was actually to allow a potentially communist nation to establish itself on the very borders of Indonesia. Although the Tunku and the Chinese-Malay leadership were strongly anticommunist, the rank and file of Chinese Malayans would in the long term tip the balance – the ethnic Chinese controlled 85% of the resources, and they were largely pro-China. Accordingly, the anticommunist segments of the Indonesian army strongly opposed the formation of Malaysia. However, the Americans did not accept this argumentation either, having full faith in Malaysian anti-communism. Washington conceded that there were a few people in the Indonesian army who held this view, but would not accept it as the primary motivator.⁴⁵ In may 1964, Guy Pauker’s report about a thousand ethnic Chinese guerillas being trained in Borneo by the army further weakened the credibility of this argument.

Ambassador Jones concluded that both the army and Sukarno actually believed that the Bornean people wanted an independent state. Jones credited this belief to false intelligence, probably with leftist origin. Furthermore, Sukarno and the army were probably influenced by spending too much time with the Azahari-milieu. The US-friendly General Nasution expressed surprise to Jones’ insistence that the US believed that the Borneans actually wanted a federation, and Nasution’s reaction surprised Jones in return. Hence, the theory of actual idealistic motives behind Konfrontasi was strengthened in Washington, but mainly as a complementing theory to Jones’ original argument of Sukarno’s emotional reasons. The Americans still could not accept that the army really believed that the British "neo-colonialism" was real, the army leadership "knew as well as the American Embassy that it was Sukarno’s confrontation policy that kept the British in Southeast Asia".⁴⁶

After the first Manila talks, Sukarno balked from entering further negotiations. During April and May, heavy diplomatic pressure was exerted on Sukarno from several parties, particularly Thailand and Australia. Foreign Minister Garfield Barwick of Australia visited Djakarta three times in May only, trying to persuade Sukarno into entering talks. Jones also added his voice to the chorus, although the US were more concerned with the petroleum negotiations and the implementation of the IMF stabilization plan at the time. Who and what actually drove Konfrontasi further now seemed increasingly unclear, as Sukarno continued to show cooperation and good will toward the US’ and their wishes in all other issues.

It was the US-led oil negotiations that provided a way back into negotiations. In the end of May, Sukarno agreed to meet Tunku Abdul Rahman privately in Tokyo. Sukarno had the opportunity by already being in Tokyo for vacation. Because of the well known secret oil negotiations, the presence of other diplomats and foreign policy advisors provided a cover, should any party desire a low profile. The talks were hosted privately by Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira, and ended in an agreement to start negations between the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines in Manila the next week.

On June 7 the three parties started negotiations in Manila, with Thai assistance. Jones was asked to be available in Manila for consultations, although neither Jones nor other Americans took part in the actual negotiations. As previously, an "Asian solution" was what all the parties desired, save for the British. The US administration, eager not to get involved in the Malaysia issue while pursuing their Action Plan in Indonesia, fullheartedly supported a negotiated "solution for Asians by Asians."

On June 11, agreement was reached. Plan for the loose confederation of Maphilindo was a set up, and Malaya, possibly without British pre-approval, had agreed to let a team of UN observers verify last years elections, to see if the pro-federation majority was plausible. A final summit for signing was planned for the end of July, and was to be held in Manila but arranged by Malaya.

The US viewed the Maphilindo plans as a positive development. Given the solid anticommunist stand of Manila and Kuala Lumpur, Indonesian plans to join Maphilindo constituted "a new expression of [Indonesian] foreign policies and one which is more compatible with the interest of the Western world than conspicuous flirtation with the Peking and Moscow". ⁴⁷ However, the honest intentions of the Malaysian and Indonesian participation in Maphilindo were uncertain. Rather, the US treated Maphilindo as a .face-saving device with positive potentials, than an actual prospect of a working Pan-Malay confederation.

After the Manila meeting, the US started to look on the British Malaysia-policy as more of an obstacle for solution, and hence hindering US efforts for stabilization in the more important Indonesia. After talks in London, the British and Malay government announced the formation of Malaysia on August 31. The Indonesians interpreted this to mean that the formation would take place regardless of the UN team’s findings, in breach with the Manila agreement. The Indonesian reaction to the London statement was increased military activity and a massive anti-Malaysia public campaign. Furthermore, Sukarno halted the preparation work with the UN survey officials, and threatened to abstain from the upcoming summit. In return, Malaya delayed the invitation to the summit, something which Sukarno interpreted as a personal insult. All these events were proof of British tactlessness leading to a worsened situation for the US efforts in Indonesia, although Sukarno was the actual perpetrator behind escalation.

By the end of July 1963, Ambassador Jones had modified his earlier conclusions on the nature of Konfrontasi.⁴⁸ Now, he found it likely that the army had been the main instigator behind Konfrontasi, after several talks with Nasution and others. Through Konfrontasi, the army maintained their West Irian-sized budgets and political importance. Several incidents pointed the direction of army responsibility, Jones argued. Particularly important was the recent announcement of the new supreme command, where the military regained their special legal powers from the Martial Law period, which had been withdrawn after the end of the West Irian conflict. What the army and Nasution actually sought, was to keep up military pressure, but without wanting to escalating it into a costly full-blown conflict. Jones added that all intelligence indicated that the Indonesian army did nothing militarily to prepare for real war, but rather continued to build themselves up against PKI and followed the US-coordinated training schemes minutely. He concluded that while the confrontation would "continue to produce clamor," ⁴⁹ there were no indications that the Indonesian were about to start any serious fighting in the near future. ⁵⁰

Jones’ arguments were supported by news analyses and reports from the fighting. The local Reuters corresponded told Jones in late February that he had information saying that the driving forces behind Konfrontasi were the armed forces and PKI, and that Sukarno sought a way out.⁵¹ Furthermore, the ineptitude of the Indonesian guerillas were striking, if not peculiar given Nasution’s renown as a guerrilla strategist. ⁵² Probably, the US assessed, the army did not want to send any real troops into the fighting, since this was not a war the army sought to win militarily. It was rather a war held for propaganda and to gain public sympathy. Hence the British slaughter of the "independence movement’s" guerillas was more of an asset to the army than a loss, as it discredited the British and made their professional Ghurka forces look brutal in comparison to the small, amateurish and volunteer-dominated guerilla-troops. ⁵³ The NSC concluded in May 1964 that the army indeed were central in Konfrontasi, and might even continue a low-level subversion campaign of their own, should Sukarno enter a peace agreement. ⁵⁴

The discrepancy between the British analyses and actions, and the US’ became wider. The British assessment of Indonesian confrontation was "not as a passing outburst of bad temper" but as "an integral part of their national policy."⁵⁵ The Indonesian objective was a Greater Indonesia including Malaysia and the Philippines, the British thought. Sukarno, PKI and the army all shared this objective for various reasons. The most important reason was the Indonesian desire to hold internal differences in bay. A common national project in foreign policy was the ideal tool for curbing internal conflicts. The ones who gained most from Konfrontasi was PKI, since Konfrontasi postponed the inevitable showdown between the army and PKI. This bought time for PKI infiltration of the army. Hence, PKI could bee seen as the driving force behind the confrontation, yet Konfrontasi was a nationalistic project shared by all three parties in the power balance, the British concluded in their arguments to Washinton. ⁵⁶

In Washington, London’s arguments were met with concern. The "current unfavorable British attitude toward Indonesians can well become a complicating factor in the forthcoming DAC consideration [of] Indonesia," State wrote to its London embassy, meaning that the British attitude endangered the multinational funding necessary to finance the stabilization plan for Indonesia.⁵⁷ The embassy were instructed to explain how the US analyzed the situation to the British, in order to make the British understand the overall importance attached to saving the stabilization plan.

State conceded to London that Indonesia still was hostile to Indonesia, but regarded it as an issue that could be solvedState conceded to London that Indonesia still was hostile to Indonesia, but regarded it as an issue that could be solved.⁵⁸ The time for courting Sukarno into the Western camp was perfect now, given the uncertainty the Sino-Soviet split had created. Opposing British views, the US found it difficult to "go along with any viewpoint which portrays current Indonesian policies as monolithic or irrevocable." Rather the Indonesian policies were "products of constantly shifting internal forces, maneuvers among Sukarno’s [overstrikes removed] competing advisers, emotionalism, prestige-hunger, opportunism and, in some cases, sheer whim." 59The US saw "no evidence of [a] single Indonesian ‘grand design’ either toward Malaysia or toward anything else." However, there may well have been "various ‘grand designs’ in [the] minds [of] different Indonesian leaders, but they [were] at best fuzzy, contradictory and subject to constant mutation.." ⁶⁰ Hence, the US rejected the notion of Indonesian basic expansionism as well as Indonesian foreign policy as a unitary force.

Furthermore, Indonesian motives should not dominate Western policy towards Indonesia, the US now ascertained, confronting that Indonesian motives had become the main focus of policy debate.⁶¹ The reason was that Indonesian motives were constantly changing, and that the Indonesians seldom achieved what they plotted for; there was a "wide discrepancy between Indonesian talents for [...] plotting and [their] ineptitude in implementing plots." In fact, the very shifting nature and complexity of Indonesian politics made the opportunities to "exert outside influence [...] considerably greater than would be the case in [a] more orderly nation." 62The US policy was therefore to actively influence Indonesian policy "by inducements and pressures," to "encourage them when they make progress and minimize inevitable backsliding." State was "convinced [that the] game will be forfeit if we merely stand aside and confine our efforts to stern lectures and periodic spanks." Concluding their case, the Americans stated that in the Malaysian issue, the carrot had to be used, and the IMF-led stabilization program had to be implemented and secured funding. Only then there was a chance of solving the Malaysia problem and improve the situation in Indonesia. Hence, the US viewed the Malaysia issue as problem which could be solved only by stabilization, while at the same time seeing the Malaysia issue as the prime obstacle against obtaining stabilization. ⁶³

The Malayans presented an alternative "grand design"- variation to the Americans: The theory of abandonment.⁶⁴ In this theory, Sukarno and Zhou En-lai had reached an agreement on hemispheres after the Bandung conference. While Indonesia should control the islands, China was given the mainland, including Malaya. The formation of Malaysia hence upset the basic understanding between Beijing and Djakarta, causing Indonesian opposition. The Malayans backed their theory with Chinese intelligence maps drawing the line, and with the Indonesian coolness towards Malaya after Bandung.

The abandonment theory seemed even more unrealistic to the Americans than the other Grand Designs: To Sukarno, and particularly the army, China was still a larger threat to Indonesian security than Malaysia would ever become, the US concluded.⁶⁵ That Sukarno actually would agree to Chinese control over Malaya while alternatives still existed, seemed unlikely—especially since the alleged agreement had been made several years ago, when PKI was much less influential and Indonesian foreign policy was more stable. The only situation in which Sukarno would sign such an agreement, was if he felt he had no choice: That China inevitable would control the area. While the Malays claimed that Sukarno actually felt this way, the Americans did not agree. Sukarno was not prone to surrender to a future Chinese hegemony. Furthermore, the Malays had been notoriously untrustworthy in their presentation of intelligence regarding Indonesia, and the plan seemed too neat to be true. This seemed to be Malayan paranoia, or just another Kuala Lumpur plot to discredit Sukarno.

In the beginning, the US saw the advent of Konfrontasi mainly as an obstacle to achieving stabilization in Indonesia. Hence they set out to find the Indonesian reasoning behind Konfrontasi, in order to halt it. Much of the US activity regarding Konfrontasi hence concentrated on finding an explanation. This was despite the Administration’s insistence on that explanations were not important, but that the continuing US efforts to influence Indonesian policy through stabilization, army contacts and cultural dissemination was to be continued regardless what reasons existed for Konfrontasi. The insignificance of Indonesian intentions was due to the Indonesian lack of ability to realize their plans, and that no single reason behind Konfrontasi probably existed—rather there was a complex range of causes and individual reasons. Konfrontasi furthermore made the US relationship with the Indonesian army more difficult, since the army supported Konfrontasi. The US had originally shared objectives with the British and supported London on Malaysia. However, the British attempts to halt Konfrontasi by firmness had started to create some dissonance between London and Washington, since Washington viewed London’s strategy and assessments regarding Konfrontasi as a hindrance to the US’ own efforts in Indonesia.

Konfrontasi in its early days had little direct impact on US actual policy at the time. The main direct consequence was that the administration spent more of its time defending and developing interpretations of Konfrontasi, rather than on adapting and adjusting its actual policies in Indonesia. Hence, the administration may have missed or underestimated the importance of other developments in Indonesia, which it otherwise might have paid more attention to—for instance the modest start of PKI’s cultural campaign against the West in summer 1963. However, the most serious result of Konfrontasi was a developing distrust between the British and the US, which later led to contrary British and US policies. This discordance would ultimately be central in the disruption of the American offensive program, where aid and economic stabilization remained the main thrust.

Aid, Stabilization and the Breakdown

The unsolved Malaysia issue eventually led to the abandonment of the stabilization program and impaired aid as a possible American leverage. The death of Indonesian Vice President Djuanda and President Kennedy dealt further blows to the American strategy. Combined with the pressure from the press, the Congress and the British, this led to the abandonment of American initiative. However, the President still sought to keep a "foot in the door" in Indonesia, despite public opposition.

The US effort to implement the stabilization plan seemed to go smoothly after the oil negotiations had succeeded. State Department was optimistic: They saw a "a pattern of events" that lend support to the "conclusion that a multilateral investment of Free world resources in Indonesia at this time might not only serve defensive purposes but also go some distance towards bringing up significant reorientation of Indonesia towards the west."⁶⁶.

The events which made State look optimistic were several. On May 26 Sukarno had unilaterally signed a stabilization plan, in defiance of PKI opposition. The Governor of the Indonesian Central Bank had also been able to negotiate rescheduling of Indonesia’s debt payments to the USSR. The negotiation was a "significant indication of Djakarta’s desire to diminish its economic and military dependence on Moscow," State Department concluded.⁶⁷ The renegotiations also meant the US could support the stabilization plan financially, something which had been politically impossible in Washington with the debt repayments at original schedule. Furthermore, the Nasakomization of the government had been postponed: Sukarno seemed to have no intention of giving any seats in the inner cabinets to the PKI. In Tokyo, the oil negotiations and the Malaysia issue both seemed to have been solved. Even if Sukarno was "certainly not fully reconciled to Malaysia," and could "be expected to continue his obstruction tactics," the Malaysia issue did not seem to threaten the stabilization efforts after the Tokyo meeting. ⁶⁸

In May, Sukarno had signed the IMF-plan and started to implement economic reforms. Inside Indonesia, First Minister Djuanda had been the main driving force behind the reforms, the US assessed.⁶⁹ The reasons why Sukarno decided to go along were several, but one reason was deemed to be the determining factor: Sukarno probably saw the reforms as favorable to himself in the Indonesian power balance. The PKI had been gaining strength for some time now, and when the Martial Laws were lifted in early May, the army would be considerably weakened. The economic reforms re-balanced the situation and made sure the PKI was kept out of important cabinet positions. Hence the administration admitted that the US efforts themselves did not create opportunities for stabilization, but rather they were efforts to use all opportunities available to their fullest extent.

From June and through the summer, the administration concentrated their efforts on securing funding to the stabilization plan. The funding was to be concerted through the IMF. The Development Assistance Committee of OECD (DAC) were to have a meeting in Paris on July 26, and on that meeting, the US intended to secure $50 million in interim loans to Indonesia for 1964, in line with a recently dispatched IMF-teams recommendations. The US would forward a stabilization loan in the $25–35 million range. The proposed total US AID contribution under the DAC-umbrella for the next year hence amounted to over $125–135 million, including $78 million in PL480 "Food-for Peace"-commitments.⁷⁰

One obstacle that still could hinder the stabilization plan was the Indonesian foreign debts, particularly to the Soviet Union. Originally, the US intelligence suggested that the recent debt deal between the Soviets and Indonesia consisted of a three year moratorium on all debts, and a doubling of the succeeding repayment period from 8 to 16 years. In hard figures, that would mean an extra $25 million in foreign exchange available on the Indonesian state budgets. However, it turned out that the moratorium only covered half that sum, and that the debts to various European countries had not been renegotiated.

The US posed a condition for forwarding aid that total Indonesian yearly net repayments of debt did not exceed $20 million. Furthermore, the US loan would only be forwarded if Indonesia refrained from further military action against Malaysia. The conditions were indirectly and privately presented to Sukarno by Jones in Djakarta. In Paris, the US delegates used a more firm presentation of the same conditions to defend the soundness of the plan to the other DAC-members. Before the DAC-meeting, the US concluded that Sukarno had "complied sufficiently with our pressure for stabilization and Bloc debt rollover".⁷¹ Despite the British "unfavorable attitude," the DAC-meeting hence accepted the American arguments and "chipped in": On July 24, the IMF approved a standby loan of $50 million to Indonesia, of which $20 million were made available soon after. On July 26, the DAC-meeting approved another $50million in fresh credit to be drawn during the same fall. The US total AID commitment was coined to $110 million. A second DAC-meeting in September should sort out more details. However, the administration needed to Congress approval on the aid funds.

In Congress, the mood against foreign aid in general was negative, and to Indonesia especially so. Sukarno had received particularly bad press during the escalation of Konfrontasi in July. Although Sukarno’s rage was understandable to the administration, given what they saw as British and Malayan provocations, the Congress did not share this interpretation of events. Outside the administration, Sukarno was generally seen as the expansionist aggressor with sole responsibility for Konfrontasi.

In mid-July, the Broomfield Amendment was proposed in the House. The amendment would bar any military aid to Indonesia, and allow economic aid only when the President personally decided the aid to be of vital interest to the United States.⁷² Behind the House’s wish to bar military aid was the basic view of Indonesia Sukarno as an aggressor, and that military aid would support that aggression; besides a moral indignation over Sukarno personally and Indonesian flirtation with leftist ideology generally.

The White House sought to defeat the amendment in the House. with one main argument, "that denying MAP cuts us off from [the] very group (Indo military) which [the Soviets] have been wooing with fancy equipment but seems to prefer us."⁷³ The administration worked variations on this argument on who they thought were persuadable Republican representatives, as well as Senators for a later Senate round. During the Congressional hearings, the administration used their full argumentational strength. The testimonies defending Indonesia’s vital importance to US national security was topped by State with General Felt’s testimony, outlining what "catastrophe" to the free world it would be, should Indonesia become communist. ⁷⁴

The House Foreign Affairs committee voted in favor of the Broomfield Amendment, and formal approval in the House of Representatives followed soon, cutting off MAP funds for 1964. The implications could be grave for the administrations long term efforts to rescue Indonesia for the West. The military insignificant MAP-program still formed the basis of the defensive half of the Action Plan, and it was through MAP that the friendship to the Indonesian army was symbolically affirmed.

The administration were confident that Senate would reverse the House cuts if Konfrontasi could be moderated. Hence, they tried to soften the negative impact the amendment had in Djakarta. The day after the amendment was publicized, Jones talked in length with an insulted Sukarno, trying to convince him of the Kennedy’s administrations efforts to reverse the Broomfield amendment. Sukarno was furthermore told that aid to Indonesia would be impossible if no agreement were reached in Manila, implying that Sukarno himself held the key to turn the Broomfield amendment and secure continued US aid. To persuade Sukarno finally of going to Manila, Jones convinced Sukarno that clerical errors was behind a delayed Malayan invitation to the Manila summit, not the deliberate offense both the US and Sukarno originally saw in the delay. From the UN, U Thant went to Djakarta to lay further pressure on Sukarno.

As the US had expected, Sukarno decided to attend the summit in the last minute, in US eyes caving in to tacit US pressure on aid while demonstrating both pride and statesmanship in public. The summit started on July 30, and by August 5 a final agreement had been made. The agreement detailed the UN surveys and the Maphilindo plans. Also, they stressed the "temporariness" of foreign bases in the area, with specific hints to the US bases in the Philippines and the British in Singapore and Malaya. To US displeasure, the CIA-support to the 1958-rebellion in Indonesia was implicitly referred to as the example of why such bases must be abolished. Still, the US supported the deal, seeing the base problem as minor technical hindrance subordinate to the greater concern of solving the conflict. Sukarno continued to show goodwill throughout August, and his annual August 17 Independence day speech was, in US eyes, a rare and promising exercise in restraint. The British, however, remained skeptics; as did Beijing, Hanoi, and the PKI.

For the US, the main problem in August and September was no longer Sukarno, nor Congress. "Our main problems [...] now seems to be with the British" Forrestal wrote to Kennedy.⁷⁵ The US had asked the British to play ball with Sukarno until the stabilization plan was safer and the formation of Malaysia in order. However, when the UN team headed for Sabah and Sarawak, the British obstructed the team’s entrance and work. Furthermore, the British hindered entrance for the Indonesian observers which had been agreed upon in the deal, on the grounds that some of the Indonesians worked for Indonesian intelligence. Only after US pressure, did the British allow a severely reduced UN survey team to start their work on August 26.

On August 29, a Malaysian act threatened to halt the process again. In a front page headline, the NY Times quoted the Tunku saying that the Malaysian federation would be formed regardless of the UN findings. The date was now fixed to September 15. Once more, the Indonesians were insulted and infuriated. In an effort to calm things down, the Malayan Foreign Minister Ghazali flew to Djakarta to talk with Subandrio. Once more, the talks succeeded after the first heat had calmed down, and Indonesia continued their support to the survey process. To have a leverage on ready hand in case of further emergencies, Kennedy approved of an immediate $10 million stabilization loan. The loan should given at Jones’ discretion, after how well the Sukarno behaved towards Malaysia in the first weeks of September.⁷⁶

On September 12, the UN team finished their work, concluding that the population indeed was in favor of the Malaysian federation. The news reached Washington before they reached Djakarta. White House and State Department agreed that Kennedy should  send Sukarno and Macapagal personal letters to pre-empt a potentially tense situation.⁷⁷

The Kennedy letter to Sukarno became an ultimatum. This time, it was the "Jones-fraction" who wanted to lean hard on Sukarno. Robert Komer, despite having changed post in the administration, rewrote the "utterly anodyne" State drafts and "strengthened [it] to [the] point of saying [that] if they went down [the] wrong Malaysia road we simply would not give them aid," commenting on his own text, "(how much blunter can you get?)"⁷⁸ To make the ultimatum acceptable, Komer wrote in a paragraph on how strong JFK desired to visit Sukarno in Djakarta next spring, but were not able to do so this fall due to political obligations. The letter was transmitted on September 13. ⁷⁹ The next day the UN published their findings, and on September 15, 1963, the Malaysian federation was declared. Like the letter to Sukarno had forewarned, Kennedy publicly stated his support to the new state. ⁸⁰

Djakarta exploded with fury. Sukarno refused to accept that the results of the UN team were correct. In the streets, PKI arranged mass demonstrations. In a few hours, the Malayan embassy had been sacked, there were riots outside the British embassy and several British and Malayan business and properties were burnt down, including Shell estates. Also outside the US embassies there were demonstrations, but little damage was done.

To the US, it seemed like the riots had, if not been instigated, so at least not properly hindered by the Indonesian Government. Still, the riots and Sukarno’s fuming reaction were neither unexpected or seen as really threatening. Subandrio assured Jones that matters would be smoothed out in a matter of weeks, this was just the necessary public outcry. The Malayan ambassador was asked by the Indonesians to stay in Djakarta unofficially meanwhile, a decision Jones supported.

The following day, Malaysia severed diplomatic ties with Indonesia. Sukarno countered within 24 hours by breaking all economic connections with Malaysia and imposing an embargo. Then a mob sacked and burned down the British embassy in Djakarta, unhindered by the government. The next few days, Indonesia made a series of minor forays into mainland Malaysia, for the first time during Konfrontasi putting Indonesian troops on the Malayan peninsula. Sukarno had chosen a between Konfrontasi and stabilization, and all evidence suggested he had chosen the glorious confrontation.

To Washington it was evident that the confrontation now had escalated to a new level. While taking time to re-evaluate strategy, Washington relied on interim assessments and actions. Firstly, a continued economic break between Malaysia and Indonesia would clearly mean the end of the stabilization effort: The Indonesian economy relied on exporting to and through Singapore and Malaya. Without access to Singapore and Malaya, the Indonesian economy had no chance of stabilizing or recovering. State estimated the Indonesian losses from the embargo to be $200–250 million p.a, or 3–4% of total Indonesian GNP. About $110 million p.a. would be lost in foreign exchange earnings, roughly 15% of estimated exports.⁸¹ Furthermore, there was little chance of continued European funding of the IMF-plan, nor future support in Congress if the situation did not improve dramatically.

The next week, an interagency group of all involved agencies and State Department agreed on an interim position on the US aid programs in Indonesia. Firstly, the $10 million immediate credit to Indonesia was deferred. The IMF were informed that the US thought the Fund should delay implementation of the actions agreed on in July. Furthermore, the IMF should be encouraged to tell the Indonesians how seriously the Malaysian embargo actually would be for their economy. The American "Food for peace"-deliveries were separated between previous commitments and new commitments. The old commitments were continued while all new commitments were halted. MAP deliveries were continued, except for arms. In line with the Broomfield amendment, all arms were deliveries halted, including those in the pipelines and in docks. This included weapons, ammunition and parts to both the military and the Mobrig. Commercial deliveries to the Indonesian military from now was furthermore be carefully screened. However, Washington purposely did not tell Djakarta that military aid had been halted, but left it to their own discovery when time demanded it. The remaining aid, mostly educational grants besides the civil part of civic action, was continued.

The administration still fostered hopes of steering Sukarno back into course. There had been crises before, and the administration had been able to solve them. The oil agreements were finally worked out in detail and signed in late September. A particular event proved that Sukarno still was responsive: When intelligence reports of Djakarta’s intent to severe diplomatic ties with Great Britain reached Washington around 25^th September, Washington tried to forestall Sukarno’s decision. Also, they tried to get the British in on a coordinated effort to coach the Tunku and Sukarno into negotiations.

Once again, Kennedy’s preferred mean was to send a personal message to Sukarno with Jones as the envoy. The brief and right-to-the point message expressed Kennedy’s disbelief that Sukarno really desired "to permit the momentum of events to carry us all to a point which would among other things imperil the entire relationship which you and I and our countries have been working toward [...]".⁸² Kennedy appealed to Sukarno’s statesmanship, finishing with a half-promise of making the Tunku and British "join in a standstill" if Sukarno were "agreeable". Kennedy’s message was combined with intensive persuasion efforts from Jones. The Americans lined up the prospect of an initial cooling-off period, so an atmosphere could be reached "in which problems can be threshed out under the Maphilindo forum." ⁸³ And once again, Sukarno said he would do as Kennedy proposed and attend a summit meeting without preconditions. ⁸⁴

To persuade the Tunku, White House decided to "get the British to agree" and to put pressure Tunku.⁸⁵ While Kennedy wrote to the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Rusk wrote to opposition leader Alec Douglas-Home (Lord Home). ⁸⁶ The US diplomatic offensive led to no immediate results in Kuala Lumpur. Yet, the episode raised hopes for a future summit, and with some luck, the Sukarno letter had kept the British in Indonesia a little while longer. However, an immediate solution seemed no closer.

With the stabilization plan temporarily stranded, the US were forced to revise their strategy towards Indonesia. Sukarno’s rhetoric continued to weaken the White House’s case in Congress, and the Committee hearings abode further restrictions on US aid in the future. Presidential determination could no longer be relied on as a lasting loophole in Congress’ anti-aid amendments. Hence, the "carrot" was removed from the administration’s carrot-and-stick policy.

Kennedy’s ultimatum in September had removed the "stick": The US had threatened to remove aid, and Sukarno had defied the ultimatum by imposing the Malaysian embargo. The US then considered briefly moving on to an actual embargo of Indonesia. However, the agrarian economy of Indonesia would be too resilient, Washington concluded, the economic damage could not be made grave enough to influence the policy makers in Djakarta. Hence, there were by fall 1963 no remaining sanctions which the West could effectively impose on Sukarno, save open military intervention.

A direct military involvement in Indonesia was exactly the form of last-resort-remedy which US policy was formulated to avoid. While the Indonesian army remained in the power balance, the issue of military intervention was not even mentioned. Likewise, violent subversive activities were not seriously considered as an option in the White House and State.⁸⁷ Although Sukarno himself believed that the CIA regularly made attempts on his life, Washington saw more risks than advantages in "getting rid of" Sukarno. ⁸⁸

The final remaining American leverage turned out to be JFK himself. Ambassador Jones had since January argued for using a visit by Kennedy to influence Sukarno. In July, the new Assistant Secretary of State For Far Eastern Affairs, Roger Hilsman, added his support. During August and September, the administration actually hinted of a possible Kennedy visit to Sukarno. However, no commitments were made, and the administration remained undecided on whether to actually use such a visit at this time or not—once used, the prospect of a personal visit by Kennedy and the actual visits of personal emissaries would probably be less influential on Sukarno.⁸⁹

In November, Washington called Jones back home for one months vacation. To scare Sukarno, Jones was officially in Washington for "consultations". The real reasons for Washington to ask Jones was primarily to let him relax after the "tremendous burden [he had] carried," and be prepared to what seemed to be another stormy period coming up.⁹⁰ "Seldom has an Ambassador been more needed for the long pull," McGeorge Bundy wrote, "but our feeling is that it is well to get a rest now to be ready for the later efforts." ⁹¹ In addition, Kennedy and various member of the administrations wanted to discuss the situation first hand with Jones. ⁹²

Jones proposed to Kennedy that the US could set up a new "package deal".⁹³ In the deal, the new American give was a visit by Kennedy in spring 1964. In addition, the Americans would use their influence to set up a tripartite meeting with Macapagal and the Tunku. To restore normal connections between the three nations, the US would then resume aid and provide 150.000 tons of emergency rice supplies. In return, Sukarno would withdraw his troops from the Malaysian borders, cease support to guerillas, take part in new negotiations, and re-establish the stabilization plan. The crucial new element in the package was the promise of a Kennedy-visit. The presidents’ persuasive abilities when talking directly to Sukarno, as well as the promise of the prestigious visit itself, was the administration’s final hope for tipping the scale, Hilsman and Jones agreed.

Kennedy concurred, saying that "he was thinking about April or May," and could be gone up to 16 days in Asia.⁹⁴ Hence, the new US offensive tactic was specifically to exchange aid and Kennedy’s personal show-up in Djakarta in return for peace and economic Westernization of Indonesia. As such, the US now once more relied on the use of top-level personal relations to save the systemic part of their offensive strategy. However, this time, it was the core relationship between Sukarno and Kennedy that would be utilized.

The administration defended its aid budget in the Senate throughout October and November, and was able to recover a significant share of the cuts made in House. However, the differing sum between the House and Senate appropriations was checked: Aid under this budget could only be forwarded on special presidential determination, and the determination had to be substantiated by national security needs. By this term, Congress introduced a control mechanism and limited the possible uses of the appropriations. Hence, the defensive US strategy, aimed at keeping a foothold of contact with friendly Indonesians, on one side remained largely unchanged thus far. On the other side, the program’s economic foundation was from December 1963 under continuous Congressional supervision.

Even if the program of building relations with the Indonesian army was continuing in the US, the first signs of threats to the program from emerged from the Indonesian side in the end of November, when Nasution was scheduled to visit Washington. On one side, the visit provided an opportunity to display extra friendliness. However, the administration realized that demonstrating too much friendliness could actually hurt Nasution’s position in Djakarta, given the rising anti-American sentiments and Nasution’s weakening position inside the cabinet. Nasution’s rival in the military hierarchy was General Yani, whom the US deemed to be an opportunist and without any strong political leanings. Sukarno had from 1962 gradually elevated general Yani’s position on Nasution’s behalf, most visibly by letting Yani take over the position as Chief of Staff of the army and then removing Nasution as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, moving Nasution further away from his military power base. A too overt display of friendliness could provide an excuse for removing Nasution from his position as Minister of Defense.⁹⁵ Eventual Eventually, State decided to let Nasution talk for some time with Kennedy, but without giving the full public show which belonged to an official visit of state.

The rise of the General Yani on Nasution’s behalf was only one of many minor indications of upcoming trouble for the US courtship of the Indonesian army. Nasution’s stance in Konfrontasi had demonstrated that General Nasution and the army was, although anticommunist, also nationalists. Nasution himself was not necessarily pro-stabilization nor was he against Konfrontasi. In the US offensive and systemic approach, the army could hence turn out to become impediments as well as assets.

The administration’s remaining hope for reviving the stabilization program were then focused on a small group of persons. Only one of them was Indonesian. In Djakarta, the most ardent supporter of stabilization had been First Minister Djuanda Kartawidaja. Besides Djuanda, few people seemed able to move Sukarno in pro-stabilization direction. On November 7, Djuanda died on a nightclub in Djakarta.

In the administration, November became the month where disillusion replaced hope. After Konfrontasi, the stabilization effort had been impaired both by Congress and Sukarno. The Indonesian army were in no position, nor seemed to have the will to support the US offensive effort. When Djuanda died, the single factor on which the whole offensive effort now seemed to rest, was Kennedy himself, through the personal rapport he was believed to have with Sukarno. The president, in the administration jargon, had become the only leverage left.

On November 22, Kennedy was shot in Dallas. At the time, both Nasution and Jones were in Washington, both still waiting for meetings with Kennedy. The psychological effect in the administration was devastating. When Kennedy died, the US not only temporarily lost political leadership, which to some degree could be substituted, they lost permanently what they only days before had concluded was their main asset towards Djakarta. "The light had gone out of the day," Jones writes, "The assassin’s bullet put an end to our plans and disposed of the immediate prospects for settlement of the Malaysia dispute."⁹⁶

As seen from Washington, the spring of 1963 had, despite Konfrontasi, seen a steady improvement in US-Indonesian relations. The stabilization effort, despite Congress reluctance to support it, seemed to be progressing and Sukarno’s anti-Malaysian actions seemed to be returning to the rhetorical level. However, the British, Malaysia, Congress and the American press viewed Sukarno’s actions as expressions of a basic expansionism which needed to be contained with firmness. Hence the British and the US, despite having basically the same objectives, counteracted each other. A circle of escalation emerged, where a firm statement from London or Kuala Lumpur, in the administration’s view, resulted in increased aggression from Djakarta or halted negotiations. The US then persuaded Sukarno into reassuming talks using future aid as leverage, and each time going closer to the point of providing Sukarno an ultimatum on aid. The peak was reached when the US used a privately conveyed ultimatum after the formation of Malaysia. Sukarno seemed first to accept, but another firm action by Kuala Lumpur again made Sukarno increase aggression.

The administration thus had exhausted all their available negative sanctions while attempting to counter the negative effects of British and Malay firmness towards Sukarno. While the British firmness stemmed from the British basic interpretation of Sukarno as basically an expansionist who had to be contained by force, the US had based their policy on the interpretation that Konfrontasi was a byproduct of complex Indonesian internal affairs, not a basic feature of Sukarno’s policy. Hence, the US believed Konfrontasi could be contained through negotiations, and that stabilization was more important than containing Sukarno by firmness.

The Congress and press put limits on how far the Administration could utilize positive sanctions. While the negative sanctions of aid had been exhausted, the positive could still be utilized through the promises of future aid if Sukarno limited Konfrontasi. However, the press and Congress, interpreted aid to Indonesia as direct support to Konfrontasi and Sukarno. By September, Konfrontasi had escalated to a stage where the Congress and Press no longer would accept continued aid to Indonesia. Hence, the US were derived of both the positive and negative sanctions built into their offensive strategy.

In an attempt to revive the offensive strategy, the US planned to utilize the personal rapport forged between Sukarno and Kennedy. The administration concluded that Kennedy through his personal connections was the only leverage the US had left. Stabilization could be gradually revived in a process where a visit by Kennedy would be the vital first step inducing Sukarno to halt Konfrontasi, which in turn would reopen the possibility of aid. When Kennedy died, the offensive strategy towards Indonesia seemed to be a hopeless effort.

All New Nothing New: Hesitation and the Final Initiatives

Johnson started his presidency at a time when the US were regrouping from the last months losses in Indonesia. During the following months, the US fell back on their backup position of keeping a foothold in Indonesia, while upgrading the halt of Konfrontasi to be a major policy objective. A final initiative to halt Konfrontasi was made through Robert Kennedy, before largely letting the British take over the policy lead in the conflict. Concerns over Vietnam and a range of other factors led to that few major policy decision during the following months, leaving US policy largely as the administration of a slow US withdrawal of aid, while maintaining contact with friends in Indonesia. An open ultimatum to Indonesia in aid in May marked the ending of the US offensive strategy towards Indonesia. Howard Jones and others has interpreted the open ultimatum as a result of Johnson’s personal policy inclinations, "Johnson was a great believer in the carrot and the stick," Jones comments on the change, underlining that the Johnson did not alter policy, but only shifted emphasis towards a harder line from December 1963. However, evidence suggests that the shift in emphasis was a slower process, and did not stem from Johnson’s personal desires for a harder line. Rather, when American ultimatums moved from its previous private forums to public statements, it was a result of pressure from the press and Congress, election concerns and the reduced influence of the Asianists within the administration, as well as a reflection of the administration’s surrender of the offensive strategy.

Johnson’s was not a stranger to the Indonesian problems facing the administration in December 1963, although neither especially involved in them. Some of his basic views on Southeast Asia can be traced from his reports from an Asian trip in 1961: "The battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination," Johnson wrote to Kennedy, and "The struggle is far from lost." Johnson saw "no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia," but "Any help [...] must be part of a mutual effort.." Yet, the greatest threat to nations like the United States was "not the momentary threat of Communism itself, rather that danger stems from hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease. We must -- whatever strategies we evolve -- keep these enemies the point of our attack [...]".⁹⁷

Although Johnson probably thought more of mainland Southeast Asia than the Southwest Pacific when writing the above lines, they proved that Johnson had a basic sympathy for using aid for national security reasons as well as for humanitarian reasons. Also, he attached importance to United States involvement in Southeast Asia. Indonesia seemed an ideal application of Johnson’s 1961 formula: Hunger was now rising and economic disturbances drove the policies leftward. In many ways, it seemed natural that "the point of our attack" remained an aid effort, as it had been under Kennedy.

However, aid was not an easy strategy to defend domestically. On December 18, the Congress finally and specifically restricted aid to Indonesia. The administration’s response and future Indonesia policy were reviewed in Johnson’s first ordinary National Security Council (NSC) meeting on January 7, 1964—it was Johnson’ "full initiation to the perils of the Presidency in a time of trouble," the Washington Post wrote, dealing with "the thorniest menace to peace in Southeast Asia—Indonesia, the mercurial Sukarno and his undeclared war [...]".⁹⁸

The NSC portrayed two likely scenarios in Indonesia. In the first scenario, Sukarno retreated from Konfrontasi. This scenario could only be achieved through an "Asian solution" excluding Western participation, the NSC concluded, since this was necessary to save face for the Indonesians. However, Sukarno would in this scenario remain hostile to Malaysia, only not as overtly as before. In the other scenario, the Indonesian open aggression continued. The aggression could also escalate, although no one in Djakarta seemed to really seek escalation. If the conflict escalated, the US would be involved through the Anzus and Seato treaties. Rusk underlined the importance of solving the crisis, the "stakes are very high," Rusk stated, "More is involved in Indonesia with it [sic] 100 million people, than is at stake in Viet Nam."⁹⁹ The US could not afford to avoid to do its best to hinder escalation of the conflict into actual war, Rusk and the NSC concluded, a conflict where the US would have to bail out its allies. ¹⁰⁰

Despite the American overall priority to avoid another war in Southeast Asia, the crisis was still mainly a British responsibility. "[A]llied solidarity in this situation" was very important, Rusk commented when Speaker John W. McCormack’s expressed a wish for continued British supremacy in policy decisions regarding Malaysia. US actions and available policies in the Indonesia-Malaysia question remained hence limited by British and Australian concerns, the NSC concluded.¹⁰¹

Leverages towards Sukarno was now very few: Both Congress and the British restricted the options, as did the need for an "Asian solution". Aid was one leverage that still could be used, although not as efficiently as before. Johnson and the NSC agreed to comply as far as they had to with the Congress legislation, and phase out restricted aid slowly and silently. Some aid to maintain contact with the army was still maintained, as the army remained the most likely successor to Sukarno and still was anticommunist. However the aid was from now on non-military only, and would specifically not strengthen any military capacity—its specific purpose was now to keep some visible US presence inside the army, as unspecified leverage and as tokens of an endangered friendship. Also, to continue some aid would hinder an open break with Djakarta, and hence secure US investments in Indonesia. It was particularly important to avoid letting the oil companies go into Chinese hands. There was full consensus on the near future objectives of the policy: To still keep a "foot in the door" in Indonesia.¹⁰²

Presidential determination had to secure the aid, and various strategies was planned to avoid public criticism as well as to avoid making such determinations into PR-opportunities for Sukarno. The most important strategy pondered, was that the aid determinations could be limited to thirty days periods, so it should not be interpreted as a commitment or major policy decision by any parties. Robert Kennedy was given responsibility for mapping out legal positions which could defend aid using this an other strategies.¹⁰³

Few other leverages seemed available. To take the issue into the UN was one possibility. McGeorge Bundy suggested sending "to Djakarta a tough man who would tell Sukarno that the president did not intend to continue assistance unless Sukarno halted the confrontation effort.," pointing to Robert Kennedy as ideal with his reservoir of goodwill with Sukarno. Despite RFK’s displayed reluctance, the president decided to heed Bundy’s advice and promptly ordered the Attorney General on another mission to Indonesia.104Hence, aid was turned further into an open instrument of political extortion, differing from the previous method of "coaching" Sukarno indirectly and in private. ¹⁰⁵

On January 16, 1964 Robert Kennedy went to meet Sukarno in Tokyo. The press covered his trip extensively, speculating in various motives behind Johnson’s decision to send Kennedy, besides for talking to Sukarno. Most analysts also saw the trip as a rescue action for aid to Indonesia, particularly after Senator Richard Russell phoned Johnson and warned him that "certifying" aid to Indonesia with reasons of "national interests" could lead to actual impeachment against Johnson, if Sukarno continued Konfrontasi.¹⁰⁶ This analysis had some basis. Behind the decision to send Robert Kennedy was implicitly the long-term objective of reviving the offensive US plan, which included economic aid. However, the direct mission of Kennedy was to calm Konfrontasi. Furthermore, The NSC’ explicit reason for calming Konfrontasi, was that an escalation would lead to unwanted US involvement. By January 1964, reviving economic aid had hence not been removed as a part of US policy plans, but it was a distant objective subordinate to the immediate concern of avoiding US direct military involvement in Indonesia.

The remaining common analyses were more personal and domestic policy-oriented. "The Attorney General needed a mission that would take him away far from the scene of a personal tragedy" speculated the Sunday Times, adding Johnson’s political need to assure Robert Kennedy of an important role in the administration, as well as the mutual need to assure the public of friendliness between Kennedy and Johnson.107There was also "by coincidence, "the Times concluded, "the urgent need to talk turkey to power-hungry President Soekarno in order to stave off growing troubles in South-East Asia, which had in them the seeds of discord between the U.S. and Britain." ¹⁰⁸ Other interpretations included that Johnson wanted to push Kennedy forward as a vice-presidential candidate. Parts of the Republican press branded the trip as irresponsible, or even as a method to get Kennedy out of the way, where he could do less harm than in Washington.

Kennedy’s assignment was specifically to persuade Sukarno to order a cease-fire and enter negotiations, similar to Kennedy’s role in the West Irian crisis. "Did you come here to threaten me?" asked Sukarno "No, I’ve come to help get you out of trouble," replied Kennedy, defusing Sukarno’s initial skepticism and expectations of ultimatum.¹⁰⁹ As with the West Irian crisis, Robert Kennedy used Sukarno’s feelings of cognition with the now late John F Kennedy. Also, he was authorized to use strong words with Sukarno, since he was believed to be one of the few who probably could do so without seriously damaging relations.

After the first Tokyo meeting, Kennedy went to Seoul, Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok to ride the momentum of the first promising talks. He persuaded Sukarno and Abdul Rahman into declaring truce, with immediate effect. Furthermore, the Maphilindo countries now agreed that the Thais led by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman were to lead a new round of negotiations and provide observers for the cease-fire under a UN mandate. A summit was planned already the following month. Robert Kennedy avoided discussion of details of the conflict and kept the US outside any commitments. It was an "Asian solution for Asians." However, only days after the oral agreement was announced on January 23, doubts were raised on the interpretation and solidity of the agreement. Yet, the cease-fire was a reality, even if it was vague and frail. Again Kennedy was acclaimed for a diplomatic victory, this time also in large type across the front pages of American press.¹¹⁰

Robert Kennedy ended his round trip in London, where he tried to persuade the British to approve the deal. The British were still skeptical on the US role in Indonesia, and particularly what seemed to be continued US military aid to a country which Britain were in semi-war with.¹¹¹ The reluctant approval from London came on January 26, despite public criticism and scorn of "the Kennedy truce" in London press. Soon after, the talks in London were continued with secret quadripartite talks in Washington. From February 10–11, politicians and experts from the US, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand discussed "Far East problems"—Southeast Asian problems in general and the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute in detail. The talks would mark the end of US-British discords over Konfrontasi.

The quadripartite talks and following bilateral talks led to a working agreement between the US and Great Britain. In exchange for British support to US polices in Vietnam, the US would support the British in Malaysia.¹¹² The talks "dispelled the doubts and apprehensions which the British had previously felt," the British Assistant Under Secretary of State stated, and it was clear that "the agreement reached between United States and the United Kingdom enable all to go forward and be able to prepare for political or military action [...]." ¹¹³ The new agreement ascertained the US commitment to support British policies in Malaysia, as well as the overall importance of British and US bases in the area. Although the Quadripartite talks concluded that Maphilindo was a worthwhile project, the parties found it unacceptable to remove any bases from the Maphilindo area, which last summers’ Manila agreement between Tunku, Sukarno and Macapagal had implied. The Singapore base was hence under a US guarantee. Also, Robert Kennedy’s truce agreement remained sanctioned, and the burden of further negotiations were henceforth put on "the Asians." ¹¹⁴

The US press increasingly caused concern for the administration in its Indonesia policy. The press’ longstanding demands for a harder line against Sukarno reinforced Congress’ demands, and was moreover beginning to harm the new president’s public image: In the end of February, the president’s advisers began to worry about impressions in the public of Johnson’s non-policy on Indonesia. "[...] until the President starts telling the town what he wants in positive terms, we’re going to continue to get a lot of innuendo that he’s not at the foreign policy helm," Komer wrote.¹¹⁵ In the administration, suggestions were aired that Johnson should assume a tougher line on Sukarno to gain "short-term domestic plusses." This only added further to Komer’s worry for Johnson. A hard line now would increase the chances of the crisis becoming "even more unmanageable," which was the last thing Johnson needed with the Arab/Israeli and Kashmir crisis already discrediting him domestically. ¹¹⁶ Public awareness of more crises would "further flak that LBJ can’t handle foreign policy, and is reversing the Kennedy line". ¹¹⁷ Komer suggested that the US played out their current aid hand as long as possible instead, by continue to graduate aid and issue private warnings only to Djakarta. A major fight in Congress to save the "mighty lean" aid budget would have the advantage that LBJ could "fob off part of the blame on Congress," should he lose the fight. ¹¹⁸ The domestically necessary hard stance should be focussed on China, rather than Indonesia or other neutral countries. Komer, with Hilsman, Harriman and Michael Forrestal’s support, postponed the shift towards a new and harder line, but the could not halt it. ¹¹⁹

A Presidential determination confirming the existing aid schedule was made on February 2, 1961.¹²⁰ In the following months, the US made few new initiatives. The President postponed and halted decisions, while the slow wind-up of aid continued. Several reasons lay behind this development: One was the lack of available options besides keeping the same course. The new president as well as the administration became more preoccupied with the troubles of mainland Southeast Asia, leaving less time for other concerns. Furthermore, initiative had to some degree been moved to Britain and Asia, through the British-US deal and Robert Kennedy truce agreement. Hence the administration had some justification for not taking important decisions before Britain or the Asian nations had altered policy or other significant events occurred. Moreover, the fear of public reactions, and possibly even impeachment, made Johnson hesitate to make any controversial aid determinations in an election year.

Among the "Asianists" in the administration there were signs of friction. In the Far East office, those working with Malaysia felt that Indonesian concerns overrode Malaysian concerns, and that particularly the ambassador in Kuala Lumpur was being kept outside events.¹²¹ The Philippine ambassador had little or no contact directly with the NSC aide Michael Forrestal and the White House, and hence were out of contact with the circles that he perceived were "running things" on a day-to-day basis. ¹²² In the White House, Southeast Asian affairs except Vietnam, increasingly circled around Sukarno and Djakarta, the "gloomy Dane [of] the Southeast Asian Hamlet." ¹²³ The general attitudes now seemed more tense and pessimistic, contrasting last years optimism. Also Robert Kennedy expressed feelings of desertion and abandonment, even betrayal. Kennedy’s involuntary, but intensive efforts to prepare for a settlement was abandoned by Johnson, and Kennedy’s "feeling grew that the President did not, and the State Department dared not, give a damn about his effort," Schlesinger writes, and Kennedy was left with "a bitter taste." ¹²⁴ In March 1964, Roger Hilsman was replaced by William Bundy, a person less close to the "Jonesian" circles. While the core group of Asianists in the White House and State remained in control over the administration’s Indonesia policy, outside forces and other commitments had severely limited their policy options. ¹²⁵ Johnson’s reluctance to use other aides than McG. Bundy combined with the increased priority he gave to Vietnam, contributed to shift American Indonesia policy more into one of administration and reaction rather than one of plans and action. ¹²⁶ As a result, US initiatives were increasingly reduced to consist of what Jones did in Djakarta, with Johnson and Washington watching events drift. ¹²⁷

The Maphilindo countries failed to actually hold a summit, halted by the interpretation of "truce". While Sukarno argued that truce implied only that the Indonesian-supported guerillas on Malaysian territory ceased fighting, Abdul Rahman demanded that the guerillas also must return to Indonesia. The Thai negotiators failed to get the parties much closer until Jones in late May devised a compromise, in which thirty-two of the 900 Indonesian "guerillas walked out of the jungles" wearing "fresh, well-starched uniforms," looking all but soldiers from combat.¹²⁸ A new summit was finally arranged in Tokyo in mid-June. Not long after, the conflict reassumed its slowly escalating course, leaving the situation tenser than ever by early fall 1964. ¹²⁹

Sukarno responded to the harder line from Washington much like the 1962 action plan had warned: With defiance. On March 25, an editorial in "in one of the leading American weekly magazines," demanded a US ultimatum on aid for peace in Indonesia. Sukarno responded " [...] we will never accept aid with political string attached. When any nation offers us aid with political strings attached, then I tell them," switching to English, "Go to hell with your aid!" The story gained feathers as it swept across American newspapers headlines, eventually leading to an open attack on Sukarno by Senator Birch Bayh, in front of the Senate:

In Washington, the Asianists were now isolated in defending aid to Indonesia. The press was antagonistic in their description of the "dictator who rose to power on the wings of American aid"¹³¹ and "the rathole" ¹³² Indonesia. The administration’s old arguments for aid fell on hostile ground or was drowned. In the public or in open Congress, the Administration could not argue that their aid actually sought to build up the very forces opposing Sukarno in the power balance. ¹³³ The Administration eventually caved in. When Sukarno launched his "action command" on May 3, 1964, the new Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, William Bundy, retorted with a an open, televised threat to Sukarno of withdrawing aid if Konfrontasi continued. The reactions in Indonesia was strong, and Sukarno warned that all US aid now might be banned. What caused the stir "was not so much the substance of the remarks" Jones summarized, for the US had said the same in private for several months, "but the fact that they had been made public." ¹³⁴ The practical result was worsened relations, and that US aid lost the little credibility as a leverage that may have remained. The statement had the negative effect of making those receiving US aid became more vulnerable to PKI propaganda, since the US openly had remarked that aid to Indonesia implied favors in return. Hence, receiving US aid could become more of a burden than an asset. ¹³⁵

By summer 1964, aid was reduced mostly to suit the contact purposes of the defensive strategy, and it faced imminent threats of being cancelled both from Djakarta and Washington. The House of Representatives strengthened the Broomfield amendment’s aid inhibitions further through the Tower amendment. The new amendment threatened to close the opening for special aid through presidential determination. However, the White House were confident that the opening for special determination could be re-established later in the legislative process, if the situation did not deteriorate dramatically.¹³⁶

In July 6, 1964 Johnson continued the aid program with a new National Security Action Memorandum. However, the memorandum concluded that "no public determination with respect to aid to Indonesia should be made at this time, in view of the unsettled conditions in the South Pacific area," hence halting all new official aid programs.¹³⁷ The limited MAP and AID programs already under Presidential determination from February continued, but were now under constant review. Rusk still expressed hopes of some leverage from the aid, but mostly through the contact the aid legitimized with Indonesian officials and leaders. ¹³⁸

US policy remained a variation over the same as defined in the 1962 action plan: The immediate offensive objective was now reduced to "halt Indonesia’s confrontation and restore equilibrium.," while the long-term defensive program was maintained.¹³⁹ US aid programs had been "an essential tool in this dual task," Rusk argued, they had "helped us keep open the communications between our two Governments and build up a limited but real leverage with the Sukarno regime, which we are using to prevent a dangerous drift from the West." ¹⁴⁰ The aid had also helped prevent "greater deterioration" of Konfrontasi. Notably, the Mobrig program had "given us valuable influence in this key organization (the country’s first line of defense against internal subversion) and has greatly enhanced its effectiveness." ¹⁴¹ Hence, Rusk implied that the most effective US program had been the one involving Mobrig.

The remaining US programs were now wholly removed of aggressive potential. "[N]o training [was] provided in such fields as ranger, pathfinder, airborne, counter-insurgency, parachute packing, in-flight refueling, and landing force staff planning," Rusk summarized to the president.¹⁴² By June 1964, 490 civilians and 170 military personnel were under technical and administrative training, including 50 officers under civic action, but excluding the university programs. ¹⁴³ Mostly for humanitarian reasons, the malaria eradication program continued, but also since a withdrawal could create negative publicity. The continuation of aid continued as there still remained some hope of calming Konfrontasi. 144However, it was to be low-key and confidential and presented to the Congress committees as a routine matter, to avoid negative publicity and in order not to encourage to Sukarno. ¹⁴⁵ The emphasis of the administration’s policy was now to keep what aid it could as long as possible, in order to secure continued contact with the anticommunist elements in Indonesia.

Johnson did not in the beginning differ extensively from Kennedy in outlook on Southeast Asia and aid policy. However, when he took over the presidency, the situation was dramatically different from only 6 months earlier. The NSC and the president now turned avoiding escalation of Konfrontasi into their main priority, besides keeping a foothold in Indonesia through army contact. A final effort to stabilized the situation and revive talks over Konfrontasi was made by sending Robert Kennedy on a Southeast Asian mission. Kennedy formed a basis for future negotiations under Thai auspices but the negotiations did not take place before June, and soon after Konfrontasi continued to escalate. In February and March, US talks with Australia, New Zealan